Although the lattice-estimator predicts that Learning with Errors instances having small and very sparse secrets can be broken by hybrid attacks with modest computational resources, no efficient open-source implementation of these attacks exists. This work implements the so-called Guess + Verify attack (G+V) analysed by Albrecht et al. (SAC'19), containing three improvements: (1) cuBLASter, a GPU-based implementation of the lattice basis reduction software BLASter by Ducas et al. (ASIACRYPT'25); (2) a dimension reduction technique for the BDD instance; and (3) a batched variant of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm. On bases of dimension 512 and above, cuBLASter outperforms BLASter. We also integrate the GPU implementation of the General Sieve Kernel by Ducas et al. (EUROCRYPT'21) into cuBLASter’s BKZ framework. Running G+V on the benchmark instances by Wenger et al. (IEEE SP'25), we show that G+V achieves significantly higher success rates than the Cool&Cruel attack (C+C) by Nolte et al. (AFRICACRYPT'24) on almost all instances, and G+V's average CPU and GPU utilization is substantially lower than the minimum reported by C+C.

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Cryptology ePrint Archive; Paper 2025/1990
Cryptology

Pulles, L., & Vié, P. (2025). Accelerating the primal hybrid attack against sparse LWE using GPUs. Cryptology ePrint Archive.