On quantum position verification : security and experimental constraints

This doctoral thesis explores quantum position verification (QPV)---a cryptographic task where one attempts to confirm someone’s geographical location. The core question that QPV aims to answer is: Are you truly at the location you claim to be? To achieve this, QPV combines two pillars of the fundamental laws of nature: (i) special relativity, which limits the speed at which information can travel to the speed of light in vacuum, and (ii) quantum mechanics, which governs the behavior of quantum particles in ways that defy intuition. QPV protocols rely on (i) timing communication between the entities involved in the protocol, and (ii) transmitting information encoded in quantum particles. However, quantum hackers may attempt to pretend to be at the claimed location while actually being elsewhere. This raises the critical question: Can one be certain that the claimed location is genuine and not forged by hackers? This thesis presents new advances toward a fundamental understanding of QPV, its security against powerful quantum hackers, and the feasibility of secure QPV protocols despite experimental challenges that, if exploited by hackers, can severely compromise their security. Furthermore, related to attacks on QPV protocols, this thesis analyzes quantum correlations that emerge in broader cryptographic primitives.

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