Three key ways of updating one's knowledge are (i) perception of states of affairs, e.g., seeing with one's own eyes that something is the case, (ii) reception of messages, e.g., being told that something is the case, and (iii) drawing new conclusions from known facts. If one represents knowledge by means of Kripke models, the implicit assumption is that drawing conclusions is immediate. This assumption of logical omniscience is a useful abstraction. It leaves the distinction between (i) and (ii) to be accounted for. In current versions of Update Logic (Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Logic of Communication and Change) perception and message reception are not distinguished. This chapter proposes an extension of Update Logic that makes this distinction explicit. The logic deals with three kinds of updates: announcements, changes of the world, and observations about the world in the presence of witnesses. The resulting logic is shown to be complete by means of a reduction to epistemic propositional dynamic logic by a well-known method.

Additional Metadata
Keywords epistemic logic, logic of action
MSC Mathematical logic and foundations (msc 03-XX)
THEME Software (theme 1)
Publisher Springer
Editor D.J.N. van Eijck (Jan) , R. Verbrugge
ISBN 978-3-642-29327-6
Series Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Project Knowledge and Interaction in Social and Economic Networks
Citation
van Eijck, D.J.N, & Verbrugge, R (Eds.). (2012). Perception and Change in Update Logic. In D.J.N van Eijck & R Verbrugge (Eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer.