On the quantum security of HAWK
In this paper, we prove the quantum security of the signature scheme HAWK, proposed by Ducas, Postlethwaite, Pulles and van Woerden (ASIACRYPT 2022). More precisely, we reduce its strong unforgeability in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) to the hardness of the one-more SVP problem, which is the computational problem on which also the classical security analysis of HAWK relies. Our security proof deals with the quantum aspects in a rather black-box way, making it accessible also to non-quantum-experts.
|, , ,|
|Lecture Notes in Computer Science|
|Hybrid Approach for quantum-safe Public Key Infrastructure Development for Organisations|
|14th International Conference on Post-Quantum Cryptography, PQCrypto 2023|
|Organisation||Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam (CWI), The Netherlands|
Fehr, S, & Huang, Y.H. (2023). On the quantum security of HAWK. In Proceedings of the PQCrypto 2023 (pp. 405–416). doi:10.1007/978-3-031-40003-2_15