On the truth-convergence of open-minded Bayesianism
The Review of Symbolic Logic p. 1- 37
Wenmackers and Romeijn  formalize ideas going back to Shimony  and Putnam  into an open-minded Bayesian inductive logic, that can dynamically incorporate statistical hypotheses proposed in the course of the learning process. In this paper, we show that Wenmackers and Romeijn’s proposal does not preserve the classical Bayesian consistency guarantee of merger with the true hypothesis. We diagnose the problem, and offer a forward-looking open-minded Bayesians that does preserve a version of this guarantee.
|The Review of Symbolic Logic|
Sterkenburg, T.F, & de Heide, R. (2021). On the truth-convergence of open-minded Bayesianism. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 1–37. doi:http://dx.doi:10.1017/S1755020321000022