Recently, optional stopping has been a subject of debate in the Bayesian psychology community. Rouder (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review21(2), 301–308, 2014) argues that optional stopping is no problem for Bayesians, and even recommends the use of optional stopping in practice, as do (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas & Kievit, Perspectives on Psychological Science7, 627–633, 2012). This article addresses the question of whether optional stopping is problematic for Bayesian methods, and specifies under which circumstances and in which sense it is and is not. By slightly varying and extending Rouder’s (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review21(2), 301–308, 2014) experiments, we illustrate that, as soon as the parameters of interest are equipped with default or pragmatic priors—which means, in most practical applications of Bayes factor hypothesis testing—resilience to optional stopping can break down. We distinguish between three types of default priors, each having their own specific issues with optional stopping, ranging from no-problem-at-all (type 0 priors) to quite severe (type II priors).

Bayesian statistics, Hypothesis testing, Model selection, Statistical inference
doi.org/10.3758/s13423-020-01803-x
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review
Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

de Heide, R, & Grünwald, P.D. (2020). Why optional stopping can be a problem for Bayesians. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review. doi:10.3758/s13423-020-01803-x