Designing agents that can efficiently learn and integrate user's preferences into decision making processes is a key challenge in automated negotiation. While accurate knowledge of user preferences is highly desirable, eliciting the necessary information might be rather costly, since frequent user interactions may cause inconvenience. Therefore, efficient elicitation strategies (minimizing elicitation costs) for inferring relevant information are critical. We introduce a stochastic, inverse-ranking utility model compatible with the Gaussian Process preference learning framework and integrate it into a (belief) Markov Decision Process paradigm which formalizes automated negotiation processes with incomplete information. Our utility model, which naturally maps ordinal preferences (inferred from the user) into (random) utility values (with the randomness reflecting the underlying uncertainty), provides the basic quantitative modeling ingredient for automated (agent-based) negotiation.

Additional Metadata
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/60
Project Representing Users in a Negotiation (RUN): An Autonomous Negotiator Under Preference Uncertainty
Conference International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Grant This work was funded by the The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO); grant id nwo/639.021.751 - Representing Users in a Negotiation (RUN): An Autonomous Negotiator Under Preference Uncertainty
Citation
Leahu, H, Kaisers, M, & Baarslag, T. (2019). Automated negotiation with Gaussian process-based utility models. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 421–427). doi:10.24963/ijcai.2019/60