2018-02-22
On rational delegations in liquid democracy
Publication
Publication
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group's accuracy on variously structured social networks.
| Additional Metadata | |
|---|---|
| , | |
| arXiv.org e-Print archive | |
| Organisation | Intelligent and autonomous systems |
|
Bloembergen, D., Grossi, D., & Lackner, M. (2018). On rational delegations in liquid democracy. arXiv.org e-Print archive. |
|
