2019-01-27
On rational delegations in liquid democracy
Publication
Publication
Presented at the
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAi 2019 (January 2019), Honolulu, HI, USA
Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group's accuracy on variously structured social networks.
| Additional Metadata | |
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| doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796 | |
| AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAi 2019 | |
| Organisation | Intelligent and autonomous systems |
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Bloembergen, D., Grossi, D., & Lackner, M. (2019). On rational delegations in liquid democracy. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 1796–1803). doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796 |
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