Liquid democracy is a proxy voting method where proxies are delegable. We propose and study a game-theoretic model of liquid democracy to address the following question: when is it rational for a voter to delegate her vote? We study the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this model, and how group accuracy is affected by them. We complement these theoretical results by means of agent-based simulations to study the effects of delegations on group's accuracy on variously structured social networks.
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAi 2019
Intelligent and autonomous systems

Bloembergen, D., Grossi, D., & Lackner, M. (2019). On rational delegations in liquid democracy. In Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (pp. 1796–1803). doi:10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011796