Additional Metadata
Keywords Approximation algorithms, Market intermediation, Mechanism design, Pricing, Two-sided markets
Stakeholder KPMG Italy
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085128
Conference ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Grant This work was funded by the The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO); grant id nwo/612.001.209 - Societal Impact Games, This work was funded by the The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO); grant id nwo/612.001.352 - Combining Machine Learning and Game-theoretic Approaches for Cluster Analysis
Citation
Colini-Baldeschi, R, Goldberg, P.W, de Keijzer, B, Leonardi, S, Roughgarden, T, & Turchetta, S. (2017). Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions. In EC 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (pp. 591–608). doi:10.1145/3033274.3085128