Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions

2017-06-26

Presented at the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (June 2017), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA

Additional Metadata
Keywords	Approximation algorithms, Market intermediation, Mechanism design, Pricing, Two-sided markets
Stakeholder	KPMG Italy
Persistent URL	doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085128
Conference	ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
Grant	This work was funded by the The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO); grant id nwo/612.001.209 - Societal Impact Games, This work was funded by the The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO); grant id nwo/612.001.352 - Combining Machine Learning and Game-theoretic Approaches for Cluster Analysis
Organisation	Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica, Amsterdam (CWI), The Netherlands
Citation APA Style AAA Style APA Style Cell Style Chicago Style Harvard Style IEEE Style MLA Style Nature Style Vancouver Style American-Institute-of-Physics Style Council-of-Science-Editors Style BibTex Format Endnote Format RIS Format CSL Format DOIs only Format	Colini-Baldeschi, R, Goldberg, P.W, de Keijzer, B, Leonardi, S, Roughgarden, T, & Turchetta, S. (2017). Approximately efficient two-sided combinatorial auctions. In EC 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (pp. 591–608). doi:10.1145/3033274.3085128

Publication