Inefficiency of Games with Social Context
Presented at the International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, Aachen, Germany
The study of other-regarding player behavior such as altruism and spite in games has recently received quite some attention in the algorithmic game theory literature. Already for very simple models, it has been shown that altruistic behavior can actually be harmful for society in the sense that the price of anarchy may increase as the players become more altruistic. In this paper, we study the severity of this phenomenon for more realistic settings in which there is a complex underlying social structure, causing the players to direct their altruistic and spiteful behavior in a refined player-specific sense (depending, for example, on friendships that exist among the players). Our findings show that the increase in the price of anarchy is modest for congestion games and minsum scheduling games, whereas it is drastic for generalized second price auctions.
|Social networks, Externalities, Game Theory, Price of Anarchy|
|Miscellaneous (acm F.2.m), Applications (acm G.2.3), SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (acm J.4)|
|Logistics (theme 3)|
|International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory|
|Organisation||Networks and Optimization|
Anagnostopoulos, A, Becchetti, L, de Keijzer, B, & Schäfer, G. (2013). Inefficiency of Games with Social Context. In B Vöcking (Ed.), .