Reduction of Market Power and Stabilisation of Outcomes in a Novel and Simplified Two-Settlement Electricity Market
Presented at the IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, Macau
Modern electricity markets conduct a two-settlement procedure. Ahead of time, they allocate definite supply as well as reserves. Close to the time of consumption, they balance supply and demand. Bidding in these two auctions poses a challenge for automated bidding by agents, which will be more common in future electricity markets and so-called “smart grids”. In a decision-theoretic model, we implement the current bidding practice that uses two independent bids and a novel, unified format that simplifies computation. We show through Monte-Carlo simulations in one-shot settings that the unified format restricts market power of suppliers in exploitable settings, and is also less vulnerable to uncertainty of bidders about market outcomes.
|Keywords||Power System Economics, Electronic Commerce, Smart Grids I.|
|THEME||Software (theme 1), Logistics (theme 3), Energy (theme 4), Software (theme 1), Logistics (theme 3), Energy (theme 4)|
|Project||Intelligent en Decentraal management van netwerken en data|
|Conference||IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology|
Höning, N.F, & La Poutré, J.A. (2012). Reduction of Market Power and Stabilisation of Outcomes in a Novel and Simplified Two-Settlement Electricity Market. In L O’Conner (Ed.), Proceedings of IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology 2012. IEEE. doi:10.1109/WI-IAT.2012.168