In this paper we use recursive modelling to formalize sanction-based obligations in a qualitative game theory. In particular, we formalize an agent who attributes mental attitudes such as goals and desires to the normative system which creates and enforces its obligations. The wishes (goals, desires) of the normative system are the commands (obligations) of the agent. Since the agent is able to reason about the normative system’s behavior, our model accounts for many ways in which an agent can violate a norm believing that it will not be sanctioned. We thus propose a cognitive theory of normative reasoning which can be applied in theories requiring dynamic trust to understand when it is necessary to revise it.
Additional Metadata
THEME Software (theme 1)
Publisher Springer
Series Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Conference International Workshop on Agents and Peer-to-Peer Computing
Citation
Boella, G, & van der Torre, L.W.N. (2005). Normative Multiagent Systems and Trust Dynamics. In Trusting Agents for Trusting Electronic Societies (pp. 1–17). Springer.