2005
Operational semantics of security protocols
Publication
Publication
Presented at the
Dagstuhl Workshop on Scenarios: Models, Transformations and Tools, Dagstuhl Castle, Germany
Based on a concise domain analysis we develop a formal semantics of security
protocols. Its main virtue is that it is a generic model, in the sense
that it is parameterized over e.g. the intruder model. Further characteristics
of the model are a straightforward handling of parallel execution of multiple
protocols, locality of security claims, the binding of local constants to role
instances, and explicitly de ned initial intruder knowledge. We validate our
framework by analysing the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol.
| Additional Metadata | |
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| Springer | |
| Lecture Notes in Computer Science | |
| Dagstuhl Workshop on Scenarios: Models, Transformations and Tools | |
| Organisation | Specification and Analysis of Embedded Systems |
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Mauw, S., & Cremers, C. (2005). Operational semantics of security protocols. In Proceedings of Scenarios: Models, Transformations and Tools - International Workshop 2003 (pp. 66–89). Springer. |
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