Yet More Modal Logics of Preference Change and Belief Revision

We contrast Bonanno's `Belief Revision in a Temporal Framework' \cite{Bonanno07:briatfTV} with preference change and belief revision from the perspective of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL). For that, we extend the logic of communication and change of \cite{BenEijKoo06:lcc} with relational substitutions \cite{Benthem07:dlfbr} for preference change, and show that this does not alter its properties. Next we move to a more constrained context where belief and knowledge can be defined from preferences \cite{Grove88:tmftc,Board02:die,BalSme06:cdm,BalSme07:aqtodibr}, prove completeness of a very expressive logic of belief revision, and define a mechanism for updating belief revision models using a combination of action priority update \cite{BalSme07:aqtodibr} and preference substitution \cite{Benthem07:dlfbr}.