Indefeasible semantics and defeasible pragmatics

M. Kameyama

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Indefeasible Semantics and Defeasible Pragmatics

Megumi Kameyama

AI Center and CSLI, SRI International

333 Ravenswood Ave., Menlo Park, CA 94025, U.S.A.

and

CWI

P.O. Box 94079, 1090 GB Amsterdam, The Netherlands

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Abstract

An account of utterance interpretation in discourse needs to face the issue of how the discourse context controls the space of interacting preferences. Assuming a discourse processing architecture that distinguishes the grammar and pragmatics subsystems in terms of monotonic and nonmonotonic inferences, I will discuss how independently motivated default preferences interact in interpretation of intersentential pronominal anaphora. In the framework of a general discourse processing model that integrates both the grammar and pragmatics subsystems, I will propose a fine structure of the preferential interpretation in pragmatics in terms of defeasible rule interactions. The pronoun interpretation preferences that serve as the empirical ground draw from the survey data specifically obtained for the present purpose. A logical implementation of the preferential rule interactions is proposed using prioritized circumscription, a nonmonotonic reasoning formalism in AI.

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1. INTRODUCTION

An account of utterance interpretation in discourse needs to face the issue of how the discourse context controls the space of interacting preferences. Assuming a discourse processing architecture that distinguishes the grammar and pragmatics subsystems in terms of monotonic and nonmonotonic inferences, I will discuss how independently motivated default preferences interact in interpretation of intersentential pronominal anaphora.

In the framework of a general discourse processing model that integrates both the grammar and pragmatics subsystems, I will propose a fine structure of the preferential interpretation in pragmatics in terms of defeasible rule interactions. The pronoun interpretation preferences that serve as the empirical ground draw from the survey data specifically obtained for the present purpose. A logical implementation of the preferential rule interactions is proposed using prioritized circumscription, a nonmonotonic reasoning formalism in AI.

2. DISCOURSE PROCESSING ARCHITECTURE

I will assume in this paper that a *discourse* is a sequence of utterances produced (spoken or written) by one or more discourse participants. *Utterances* are tokens of sentences or sentence fragments with which the speakers communicate certain information, and it is done in a *context*. Utterance interpretation depends on the context, and utterance meaning updates the context.

A specification of the complex interdependencies involved in utterance interpretation is greatly facilitated if it is couched in a discourse processing architecture that is both logically coherent and as closely as possible an approximation of the human cognitive architecture for discourse processing. What are the major modules of the architecture, and what types of inferences do they support? I claim that the most fundamental separation is between the spaces of *possibilities* and *preferences*.

2.1 Separating Combinatorics and Preferences

There is an assumption in computational linguistics that combinatorics should take precedence to preferences. The wisdom is to maximize the combinatoric space of utterance interpretation and to keep a firm line between this space and the other, preferential, space of interpretation. Preferences are affected by computationally expensive open-ended commonsense inferences. Combinatorics determine all and only possible interpretations, and preferences prioritize the possibilities.[1] Seen from another point of view, combinatorics are *indefeasible* — that is, never overridden by commonsense plausibility, whereas preferences are *defeasible* — that is, can be overridden by commonsense plausibility. I will henceforth assume that the grammar and pragmatics subsystems consist of indefeasible and defeasible rules, respectively.[2]

An example of indefeasible rules of grammar in English is the Subject-Verb-Object constituent order. Sentence *Coffee drinks Sally* uttered in a normal intonation cannot mean "Sally drinks coffee" despite the commonsense support. An example of defeasible preferences is the interpretation of pronoun *he* in discourse "*John hit Bill. He was severely injured.*" The combinatoric rule of pronoun interpretation would say that both John and Bill are possible referents of *he*, while the preferential rule would say that Bill is preferred here because it is more plausible that the one who is hit gets injured rather than vice versa. Crucially, this

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[1]This separation of rule types does not imply a sequential ordering between the two processing modules. Different rule types can be interleaved for interpreting or generating a subsentential constituent.

[2]The same formal system can be viewed from different viewpoints — as a system of *rules*, *constraints*, or *inferences*. Rules produce and transform structures in a system, constraints reduce possible structures, and inferences are used to reason about structures (e.g., manipulating assertions or drawing conclusions), as the "logic" in the standard sense. To take a prominent example, in the "parsing as deduction" paradigm (Pereira and Warren, 1980), context-free rules are also seen as deductive inference rules. The rule S →NP VP is translated into the inference rule NP(i,j) $\land$ VP(j,k) → S(i,k). I will not adhere to one particular viewpoint in this paper, and rather take advantage of the flexibility.

preference is overridden in certain contexts. For instance, if Bill is an indestructible cyborg, the preferred assignment of *he* would shift to John.

The inferential properties of the *grammar* subsystem as a space of possibilities are well-illustrated in the so-called unification-based grammatical formalisms (UBG). A UBG system consists of context-free phrase structure constraints and unification constraints. Maxwell and Kaplan (1993) describe how the constraint interactions can be made efficient by exploiting the following properties of a UBG system: (1) *monotonicity* — no deduction is every retracted when new constraints are added, (2) *independence* — no new constraints can be deduced when two systems are conjoined, (3) *conciseness* — the size of the system is a polynomial function of the input that it was derived from, and (4) *order invariance* — sets of constraints can be processed in any order without changing the final result.[3]

The inferential properties of the *pragmatics* subsystem are much less understood. Its general features can be characterized as those of *preferential reasoning*, a topic more studied in AI than in linguistics. The pragmatics subsystem contains sets of preference rules that, in certain combinations, could lead to conflicting preferences. This fundamental indeterminacy leads to the properties opposite from those of the grammar subsystem: (1) *nonmonotonicity* — preferences can be cancelled when overriding preferences are added, (2) *dependence* — new preferences may result when two pragmatic subsystems are conjoined, (3) *explosion* — the system size is possibly an exponential (or worse) function of the input that it was derived from, and (4) *order variance* — changing the order in which sets of preferences are processed may also change the final result. The key to a discourse processing architecture is to preserve the above computational properties of the grammar subsystem while striving for a maximal control of the preference interactions in the pragmatics subsystem.[4]

Existing logical semantic theories employing dynamic interpretation rules (e.g., Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991; Kamp and Reyle, 1993) formalize the basic context-dependence of indefeasible semantics. While these theories predict the *possible* dynamic interpretations of utterances, they are not concerned with how to compute the relative preferences among them. Lascarides and Asher (1993) extend the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (Kamp, 1981) with the interactions of defeasible rules for integrating a new utterance content into the discourse information state. The input to their defeasible reasoning is a fully interpreted DR structure (DRS), with all the NP's already interpreted. The pragmatics subsystem I am concerned with here also includes the defeasible rules for NP interpretation and constituent attachments needed for DRS construction. The input to pragmatics in the present proposal is a much less specified logical form, and pragmatics kicks in *during* DRS construction.

2.2 The Processing Architecture

The discourse processing architecture that I will assume in the background of the remainder of this paper is this.[5]

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[3]Grammar rules can be seen from two viewpoints — they *eliminate* at the same time as *create* possibilities. The former applies when communication is seen as incremental elimination of possible information states. The latter applies when it is seen as incremental increase of information content. I leave the choice open here.

[4]In contrast, the abduction-based system (Hobbs, et al., 1993) does not separate grammar and pragmatics. All the rules are defeasible and directly interact in one big module. (The defeasibility of grammar rules is motivated by the fact of disfluencies in language use.) The result is an increased computational complexity.

[5]This architecture is in line with Stalnaker's (1972:385) conception:

- Let *discourse* be a sequence of utterances, $utt_1, \ldots, utt_n$. We say that utterance utt_i defines a *transition relation* between the *input context* C_{i-1} and the *output context* C_i. Context C is a multi-component data structure (see section 2.3). The transition takes place as follows.

- Let *grammar* G consist of rules of syntax and semantics that assign each utterance utt_i the *initial logical form* Φ_i.

- Φ_i represents a disjunctive set of underspecified formulas containing unresolved references, unscoped quantifiers, and vague relations. Φ_i is the weakest formula that packages a *family* of formulas that covers the entire range of possible interpretations of utt_i. (see section 3)

- Let *pragmatics* P consist of rules for specifying and disambiguating Φ_i in context C_{i-1}. Ideally, P outputs the single *preferred interpretation* ϕ_i^k (ϕ_i^k subsumes Φ_i and there is no ϕ_i^j that is preferred over ϕ_i^k and that also subsumes Φ_i), and integrating ϕ_i^k into context C_{i-1} produces the *preferred output context* C_i. In a less felicitous case, the rules of P do not converge, resulting in multiple interpretations and output contexts.

2.3 Context

My aim here is to introduce the basic components of the context C in the above discourse processing architecture that I assume in the remainder of the paper.

Context C_i is a 6-tuple $\langle \phi_i^k, D_i, A_i, I_i, L, K \rangle$ consisting of the fast-changing components, $\langle \phi_i^k, D_i, A_i, I_i \rangle$, significantly affected by the dynamic import of utterances and the slow-changing components, $\langle L, K \rangle$, relatively stable in a given stretch of discourse instance. ϕ_i^k is the preferred interpretation (see section 2.2) of the last utterance utt_i in the form of a logical form that preserves aspects of the syntactic structure of utt_i — best thought of as a short-term register of the surface structure of the previous utterance similar to the proposal by Sag and Hankamer (1984). D_i is the *discourse model* — a set of information states that the discourse has been about, which also incorporates the content of ϕ_i^k. D_i contains sets of situations, eventualities, entities, and relations among them, associated with the evolving event, temporal, and discourse structures. A_i is the *attentional state* — partial order of the entities and propositions in D_i, where the ordering is by *salience*. A_i is separated from D_i because the same D_i may correspond to different variants of A_i depending on the particular sequence of utterances in particular forms describing the same set of facts. I_i is the *indexical anchors* — a set of indexically accessible objects in the current discourse situation, for instance, the values of indexical expressions such as *I, you, here,* and *now*. The slow-changing components are the *linguistics knowledge* L and *world knowledge* K used by the discourse participants. Although we know that discourse participants never share exactly the same mental state representing these components of the context, there must be a significant overlap in order for a discourse to be mutually intelligible. For the purpose of this paper, I will simply assume that context C is sufficiently shared by the participants.

The syntactical and semantical rules for a language determine an interpreted sentence or clause; this, together with some features of the context of use of the sentence or clause, determines a truth value. An interpreted sentence, then, corresponds to a function from contexts into propositions, and a proposition is a function from possible worlds into truth values.

The next section elaborates on the initial logical form Φ_i that plays a crucial role of defining the grammar–pragmatics boundary in the discourse processing architecture.

3. INDEFEASIBLE SEMANTICS
The initial logical form (ILF) Φ represents the utterance's structure and meaning at the grammar–pragmatics boundary. This section discusses the general features of ILF with examples.

3.1 General Considerations
There are specific proposals for the ILF Φ in the computational literature (e.g., Alshawi and van Eijck, 1989; Alshawi, 1992; Hwang and Schubert, 1992a; 1992b; Pereira and Pollack, 1991). Details in these proposals vary, but there is a remarkable agreement on the general features.

The ILF Φ contains "vague" predicates and functions representing *what* the utterance communicates. Vague predicates and functions represent various expression and construction types whose interpretation depends on the discourse context. They include unresolved referring expressions such as the pronoun *he*, unscoped quantifiers such as *each*, vague relations such as the relation between the nouns in a noun–noun compound, unresolved operators such as the tense operator *past* and the mood operator *imperative*, and attachment ambiguities such as for PP–attachments. The idea can also be extended to underspecify lexical senses at the ILF level. These predicates and functions generate 'assumptions' that need to be resolved or 'discharged' in the union of the discourse and sentence contexts. The ILF is thus *partial* and *indefeasible* — partial because it does not always have a truth value, and indefeasible because further contextual interpretations only prioritize possibilities and specify vagueness.

The ILF Φ also represents aspects of the utterance's surface structure relevant to *how* the utterance communicates the information content (e.g., the Topic–Focus Articulation of Sgall et al., 1986). The syntax–semantics corepresentation could be achieved in either of the two options: (1) the logical form is *structured*, representing aspects of phonological and surface syntactic structures such as the grammatical functions of nominal expressions, linear order, and topic–comment structure; or (2) the partial semantic representation is *corepresented* with phonological and syntactic structures with mappings among corresponding parts. In this paper, the choice is arbitrary as long as certain syntactic information is available at the logical form.

There is a general question of *how far* and *how soon* the ILF gets specified and disambiguated by the pragmatics. The above existing proposals in the computational literature assume that each utterance is completely specified and disambiguated before the next utterance comes in. The utterance content must also be integrated into the evolving discourse structure, event structure, and temporal structure in the context, as discussed by Lascarides and Asher (1993). An utterance's complete interpretation is not in general available on the spot, however, and it often has to wait till some more information is supplied in the subsequent discourse (Grosz, et al., 1986). It is also possible that only the information concerning those entities that are significant or salient (or 'in focus') in the current discourse need be fully specified and disambiguated.[6] The present discourse processing architecture allows such

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[6] A comment by Paul Dekker.

incremental and partial specification and disambiguation of the information state along discourse progression though this perspective is not explored in any technical detail here.

In sum, the ILF represents the indefeasible semantics of an utterance by leaving the following context–dependent interpretations underdetermined: reference of nominal expressions, modifier attachments, quantifier scoping, vague relations, and lexical senses. The ILF also leaves open how the given utterance is integrated into the temporal, event, and discourse structures in the context.

3.2 Our Working Formalism

I will use a simplified ILF in this paper. It is an underspecified predicate logic in a davidsonian style — a version of QLF (Kameyama, 1994) without the aterm–qterm distinction. The ILF for the utterance *"He made a robot spider"* is as follows:

$$decl\ (past[\exists exy[make(e) \wedge Agent_{Subj}(e, x) \wedge pro(x) \wedge he(x)$$
$$\wedge\ Theme_{Obj}(e, y) \wedge indef\_sg(y) \wedge spider(y) \wedge nn\_relation(y, \lambda z(robot, z))]])$$

It contains the following vague predicates and functions:

- unresolved unstressed pronoun "he" — $pro(x) \wedge he(x)$

- unscoped quantificational determiner "a" — $indef\_sg(y)$

- a vague relation for a noun-noun compound "robot spider"
  — $nn\_relation(y, \lambda z(robot, z))$ (a relation between a spider entity and a robot property)

- unresolved past tense — $past(\psi)$

- unresolved declarative mood — $decl(\psi')$

If the preferred interpretation of the utterance is that "John" made a robot shaped like a spider, we have the following DRS–like logical form:

$$\exists etxy[make(e) \wedge Time(e, t) \wedge Agent_{Subj}(e, x) \wedge named(x, john)$$
$$\wedge\ Theme_{Obj}(e, y) \wedge spider\_like(y) \wedge robot(y)]$$

The interpretation is complete when the content is integrated into the discourse structure, event structure, and temporal structure in the context. These structures are assumed to be in the discourse model D in the present context structure. The pragmatics subsystem must make all of the preferential decisions including NP interpretation and operator interpretation as well as contextual integration.[7]

3.3 Ambiguity and Underspecification

The initial logical form mixes both ambiguity and underspecification. The choice is largely arbitrary when the number of possible interpretations is exhaustively enumerable. Whenever there are n possible interpretations for a linguistic item or construction type, we can have

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[7]I assume that various preferential decisions are interleaved rather than sequentially ordered within pragmatics.

either (1) a disjunctive set of n interpretations $i_1, ..., i_n$, from which the pragmatics chooses the best, or (2) one underspecified interpretation which the pragmatics further specifies. Pragmatic disambiguation and specification involve exactly the same kind of an interplay of linguistic and commonsense preferences, and relative preferences in disambiguation and specification are often interdependent.

Consider *He made a robot spider with six legs.* There is a preference for the interpretation "a robot spider with six legs" over the alternative "a male person with six legs". This preference is overridden in certain contexts, for instance, if the person is a fictional figure who can freely change the number of legs to be two, four, or six, the alternative reading becomes equally plausible. Note that the attachment disambiguation and pronoun interpretation are interdependent here.

When the number of possible interpretations cannot be exhaustively enumerated, however, ambiguity and underspecification are not interchangeable, and we must posit an *underspecified relation* as a semantic primitive. A sufficient but not necessary condition for positing an underspecified relation is this (Kameyama, 1994):[8]

> An underspecified relation is posited when there is an open–ended set of possible specific relations associated with a construction type, and the interpretation is typically affected by *ad hoc* facts known in the discourse context.

A canonical example is the interpretation of noun–noun compounds such as *elephant pen.* It could mean a pen shaped like an elephant, a pen with elephant pictures on the body, a pen with a small toy elephant glued on the top, or, depending on the context, a pen that the speaker found on the ground when she was pretending to be an elephant. All what we can tell from the grammar of noun-noun compounds is that it is a pen that has some salient relation with elephants. It makes sense, then, to explicitly state in the grammar output the vague notion of "some salient relation" as a primitive. This is the basic motivation of the proposal for underspecified relations in the logical form in the computational literature (e.g., Alshawi, 1990; Hobbs et al., 1993). The same thing goes with the scope ambiguities. The number of possible scopings is always bounded but possibly very large (on the order of hundreds), and speakers are often unable to select a single specific scoping, so the grammar should defer assigning specific scopings to a sentence and give it to pragmatics (Hobbs, 1983; Reyle, 1993; Poesio, 1993).

In sum, with the ILF sealing off the space of grammatical reasoning, the present discourse processing architecture magnifies the importance of pragmatics in utterance interpretation. Pragmatics achieves anaphora resolution, attachment disambiguation, quantifier scoping, vague relation spcification, and contextual integration all in one module. Is there a system in the chaos? That is the question we turn to now.

4. DEFEASIBLE PRAGMATICS
This section discusses the features and examples of the defeasible rules in the pragmatics subsystem.

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[8]We have here an operational criteion for separating out grammar and pragmatics. It leads to a discovery of cross–linguistic variation in the grammar–pragmatics boundary. Long–distance dependency is a case in point (Kameyama, 1994).

4.1 General Considerations

By *defeasible*, I mean a conclusion that has to be retracted when some additional facts are introduced. This characterizes the *preferential* aspect of utterance interpretation with the nonmonotonicity property. Grammatical reasoning is governed by the standard Tarskian notion of valid inference in standard logic — "Each model of the premises is also a model for the conclusion." Pragmatic reasoning distinguishes among models as to their relevance or plausibility, and is governed by the notion of plausible inference (Shoham, 1988) — "Each *most preferred* model of the premises is a model for the conclusion." The preference can be stated in terms of default rules as well, so the general reasoning takes the form of "as long as no exception is known, prefer the default." In utterance interpretation, this form of reasoning chooses the best interpretation from among the set of possible ones. The present focus is the factors that affect the interpretation preferences of intersentential pronominal anaphora.

4.2 Earlier Computational Approaches to Pronoun Interpretation.

Computational research on pronoun interpretation has always recognized the existence of powerful grammatical preferences, but there are different views on their status in the overall processing architecture. Hobbs (1978) discussed the relative merit of purely grammar–based and purely commonsense–based strategies for pronoun interpretation. His grammar–based strategy that accounts for 98% of a large number of pronouns in naturally occurring texts simply could not be extended to account for the remaining cases that only commonsense reasoning can explain. He settled in a "deeper" method that seeks a global *coherence* arguing that *coreference* can be determined as a side–effect of coherence–seeking interpretation. The abduction–based approach (Hobbs et al., 1993) is an example of such a general inference system, where syntax–based preferences for coreference resolution are used as the *last resort* when other inferences do not converge.

Sidner's (1979; 1983) local focusing model used an *attentional* representation level to mediate the grammar's *control* of discourse inferences. For each pronoun, there is an ordered list of potential referents determined by local focusing rules, and the highest one that leads to a consistent commonsense interpertation of the utterance is chosen. Common sense has a vetoe power over grammar-based focusing in the ultimate interpretation, but common sense *is* the last resort, contrary to Hobbs' approach. Carter (1987) implemented Sidner's theory combined with Wilks' (1975) preferential semantics, and reported the success rate of 93% for resolving pronouns in a variety of stories — only 12% were resolved using commonsense inferences.

Grammar's role in the control of inferences was the original motivation of the *centering model* (Joshi and Weinstein, 1981). The proposal was to use the *monadic* tendency of discourse (i.e., tendency to be centrally about one thing at a time) to control the *amount of computation* required in discourse interpretation. Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein (1983) proposed a refinement of Sidner's model in terms of centering, and highlighted the crucial role of pronouns in linking an utterance to the discourse context. Subsequent work on centering converged on an equally significant role of the main clause SUBJECT (Kameyama, 1985; 1986; Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein, 1986; Brennan, Friedman, and Pollard, 1987). Hudson D'Zurma (1988) experimentally verified that speakers had a difficulty in interpreting a discourse where a centering prediction was in conflict with commonsense plausibility, leading to a 'garden path' effect. An example from her experiment is: *"Dick had a jam session with Brad. He played trumpet while Brad played bass. ??He plucked very quickly."* Centering

models the local attentional state management in an overall discourse model proposed by Grosz and Sidner (1986).

These computational approaches to discourse have recognized the non–truth–conditional effects on utterance interpretation coming from the utterance's *surface structure* (i.e., phonological, morphological, and syntactic structures). Although this aspect of interpretation cannot be neglected in a discourse processing model, its relevance to a logical model of discourse semantics and pragmatics has remained unclear. It is worth pointing out that discourse pragmatics in the above computational approaches as well as in philosophy (e.g., Lewis, 1979; Stalnaker, 1980) has generally assumed a dynamic architecture. Would there be a potential fit with the dynamic semantic theories in linguistics (e.g., Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982; Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1991) in such a way that forms a basis for an integrated logical model of discourse semantics and pragmatics? In this paper, I propose a pronoun interpretation model taking ideas from *both* computational and linguistic traditions, and present it in such a way that it becomes tractable for logical implementation.

5. PRONOUN INTERPRETATION PREFERENCES: FACTS
Pronoun interpretation must be carried out in an often vast space of possibilities, somehow controlling the inferences with default preferences coming from different aspects of the current context. Pronouns such as *he, she, it* and *they* can refer to entities talked about in the current discourse, present in the current indexical context, or simply salient in the model of the world implicitly shared by the discourse participants. Since the problem space is vast and complex, we need to narrow it down to come to grips with interesting generalizations. I will now limit our discussion to the interpretation of the anaphoric use of *unstressed* male singular third person pronoun *he* or *him* in English.

5.1 Survey and the Results
I conducted a survey of pronoun interpretation preferences using the discourse examples shown in Table 1. These examples were constructed to isolate the relevant dimensions of interest based on previous work (see section 5.2).

One set of examples, A–H, involve pronouns that occur in the second of two–sentence discourses. They were presented to competent (some nonnative) speakers of English in the A-F-C-H-E-D-B-G order, avoiding sequential effects of two adjacent similar examples. The speakers were instructed to read them with no special stresses on words, and to answer the who-did-what questions about pronouns in boldface. The answer "unclear" was also allowed, in which case, the speaker was encouraged to state the reason. The total number of the speakers was 47, of which 10 were nonlinguist natural language researchers and 4 were nonnative but fluent English speakers. The second set of examples, I–L, are longer discourses. They were given to disjoint sets of native English speakers, none of whom are linguists.

The examples fall under two generalcategories, as indicated in Table 1. One group isolates the *grammatical effects* by minimizing commonsense biases. In these examples, it is conjectured that there is no relevant commonsense knowledge that affects the pronoun interpretation in question. The other group examines the *commonsense effects* of a specific causal knowledge of hitting and injuring in relation to the grammatical effects observed in the first group.

Table 2 shows the survey results. The $\chi^2_{df=1}$ significance for each example was computed by

Grammatical Effects:
A. John hit Bill. Mary told **him** to go home.
B. Bill was hit by John. Mary told **him** to go home.
C. John hit Bill. Mary hit **him** too.
D. John hit Bill. **He** doesn't like **him**.
E. John hit Bill. **He** hit **him** back.
K. Babar went to a bakery. He greeted the baker. **He** pointed at a blueberry pie.
L. Babar went to a bakery. The baker greeted him. **He** pointed at a blueberry pie.
Commonsense Effects:
F. John hit Bill. **He** was severely injured.
G. John hit Arnold Schwarzneggar. **He** was severely injured.
H. John hit the Terminator. **He** was severely injured.
I. Tommy came into the classroom. He saw Billy at the door. He hit him on the chin. **He** was severely injured.
J. Tommy came into the classroom. He saw a group of boys at the door. He hit one of them on the chin. **He** was severely injured.

Table 1: Discourse Examples in the Survey

adding an evenly divided number of the "unclear" answers to each explicitly selected answer, reflecting the assumption that an "unclear" anser shows a genuine ambiguity. Preference is considered *significant* if $p < .05$, *weakly significant* if $.05 < p < .10$, and *insignificant* if $.10 < p$. Insignificant preference is interpreted to mean ambiguity or incoherence. It follows from the Gricean Maxim that ambiguity must be avoided in order for an utterance to be pragmatically felicitous. An example with an insignificant preference is thus infelicitous, and should not be generated.

It must be noted that the present survey results exhibit only one aspect of preferential interpretation — namely, the *final* preference reached after an unlimited time to think. They do not represent the *process* of intereprepetation — for instance, a number of speakers commented that they had to *retract* the first obvious choice in example I. This garden–path effect verified in Hudson D'Zurma's (1988) experiments does not show up in the present survey results.

5.2 Discussion of the Results
The present set of examples highlights four major sources of preference in pronoun interpretation — *SUBJECT Antecedent Preference, Pronominal Chain Preference, Grammatical Parallelism Preference*, and *Commonsense Preference*. These are stated at a descriptive level with no theoretical committments. A theoretical account of the same set of facts will be given in section 6. Each source of preference is discussed below.

SUBJECT Antecedent Preference. A hierarchy of the preferred intersentential antecedent of a pronoun has been proposed in the centering framework, which basically says that the main clause SUBJECT[9] is preferred over the OBJECT (Kameyama, 1985,1986;

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[9]Grammatical functions will be in uppercase in order to avoid the ambiguity of these words.

	Answers			$\chi^2_{df=1}$	p
A.	John 42	Bill 0	Unclear 5	37.53	$p < .001$
B.	John 7	Bill 33	Unclear 7	14.38	$p < .001$
C.	John 0	Bill 47	Unclear 0	47	$p < .001$
D.	J. dislikes B. 42	B. dislikes J. 0	Unclear 5	37.53	$p < .001$
E.	John hit Bill 2	Bill hit John 45	Unclear 0	39.34	$p < .001$
K.	Babar 13	Baker 0	Unclear 0	13	$p < .001$
L.	Babar 3	Baker 10	Unclear 0	3.77	$.05 < p < .10$
F.	John 0	Bill 46	Unclear 1	45.02	$p < .001$
G.	John 24	Arnold 13	Unclear 10	2.57	$.10 < p < .20$
H.	John 34	Terminator 6	Unclear 7	16.68	$p < .001$
I.	Tommy 3	Billy 17	Unclear 1	9.33	$.001 < p < .01$
J.	Tommy 10	Boy 7	Unclear 3	0.45	$.50 < p < .70$

Table 2: Survey Results

Grosz et al., 1986). This preference is confirmed in examples A and B.[10]

The consistency of this preference across examples A and B demonstrates that grammatical functions rather than thematic roles are the adequate level of generalization. In both A and B, the thematic roles of Bill and John in the first sentence are agent and theme (or patient), respectively, but the switch in grammatical functions by passivization causes the interpretation to switch accordingly.

Example C demonstrates the defeasibility of this preference in the face of the parallelism induced by the adverb *too* as a side effect of an indefeasible *conventional presupposition* (see section 6).

Pronominal Chain Preference. This is the preference for a chain of pronouns across utterances to corefer.[11] Examples K and L are a minimal pair of structural effects without a commonsense bias. Their contrast shows the effect of grammatical positions. The SUBJECT–SUBJECT chain of pronouns (example K) supports a significant coreference preference ($p < .001$) whereas the OBJECT-SUBJECT chain (example L) supports a weakly significant *noncoreference* preference ($.05 < p < .10$) indicating a parallelism effect below.

Example I shows that the causal knowledge also *in the end* overrides a stretch of SUBJECT pronominal chain, but as noted above, this example causes the speakers to first interpret the SUBJECT pronouns to corefer, then *retract* the choice due to the inconsistency with a causal knowledge. This processing tendency indicates that the grammatical preference is processed faster than the commonsense preference. We'll come back to this issue later.

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[10]Some speakers indicated that they had to assume additional facts in order to make a plausible scenario — for instance, in example A, "Mary is a teacher, and she sent John home as a punishment". The speakers seem to want some more information to make the judgment more conclusive. What are the relationships among these three people mentioned out of the blue? I realize that this sort of impoverished examples rarely occur in our real-life discourses. In order to sort out some rather delicate interplay of preferences, however, we need to start out with simplified examples. This is analogous to the use of the "blocks world" (i.e., the world of blocks) in AI.

[11]I will use the simple terminology of "referent" and "coreference" without committing to their realist connotation because this does not affect the points I wish to make in this paper.

In example J, the strong preference for a SUBJECT pronominal chain is undermined by the indefiniteness of the referent (*one of the boys*) that the generic causal knowledge supports and by the additional inference — when one hits one of a group of boys, he would be revenged by the group. The grammar-based preference and common sense are in a tie here, showing a genuine ambiguity (or incoherence) $(.50 < p < .70)$.

Grammatical Parallelism Preference. There is also a general preference for two adjacent utterances to be grammatically parallel. The parallelism requires, roughly, that the SUBJECTs of two adjacent utterances corefer and that the OBJECTs, if applicable, also corefer. This preference is demonstrated in example D that involves two pronouns.[12] In example L, the parallelism preference overrides the pronominal chain preference.

Example E shows the defeasibility of the parallelism preference in the face of the presupposition triggered by adverb *back*. An "x hit y back" event conventionally presupposes that a "y hit x" event has previously occurred, leading to the near-unanimous interpretation "Bill hit John back."

Commonsense Preference. Examples F–H illustrate the effect of a simple causal knowledge that dictates the final interpretation over and above the grammatical preferences. In example F, the SUBJECT Antecedent Preference is defeated by an inference derived from the generic causal knowledge such as — "when X hits Y, Y is normally hurt," and "being injured is being hurt." Since the example involves some "normal" fellows called John and Bill, it applies with full force (46/47).

Examples G and H show what happens to this baseline default when the described event involves some special individuals (fictitious or nonfictitious) that the speakers have some knowledge about. In example H, the preferred interpretation (34/47) swings to the one where the normal fellow, John, is injured as a result of attempting to assault the indestructible cyborg. The cyborg also could have been injured (6/47) (because the movie showed that it *can* be destroyed after all). In example G, John attempts to assault a warm-blooded real person, Arnold, who seems a little stronger than normal fellows. Here, more speakers thought that John was injured (24/47) than Arnold was (13/47), but this preference is insignificant $(.10 < p < .20)$. It reflects the indeterminacy of whether Arnold is a normal fellow or not, which affects the applicability of the generic causal knowledge. Of interest here is the fact that the three speakers who knew *nothing* about what a "Terminator" is *all* interpreted that John was injured in example H. They clearly sensed "something nasty and abnormal" about this thing with such a name.

5.3 Descriptive Generalizations

Table 3 summarizes the pronoun interpretation preference predicted by each of the four sources discussed above and the final preference outcome verified in the survey. We see general defeat patterns that resolve conflicting preferences before the final interpretation:

1. Conventional Presuppsitions (triggered by adverbs in examples C and E) and Commonsense Preferences dictate the *final* preference.

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[12]Another possible source of preference is the *causal link* between the two described eventualities, John's hitting Bill ($e1$) and someone disliking someone ($e2$). The preferred interpretation supports the causal link "$e1$ *because* $e2$", while the alternative interpretation, which nobody took, supports "$e1$ *therefore* $e2$". These could be stated in terms of discourse relations of *Explanation* and *Cause* (e.g., Lascarides and Asher, 1993). I'm not aware of any empirical studies of this kind of preference effects.

	Subj.Pref.	Pron.Chain	Parallel.	Com.Sense	Outcome
A.	John	—	Bill	unclear	John
B.	Bill	—	John	unclear	Bill
C.	John	—	Bill	unclear	Bill♣
D.	John–Bill?	—	John–Bill	unclear	John–Bill
E.	John–Bill?	—	John–Bill	unclear	Bill–John◇
K.	Babar	Babar	Babar	unclear	Babar
L.	Baker	Babar	Baker	unclear	Baker
F.	John	—	John	Bill	Bill
G.	John	—	John	John/Arnold	John/Arnold
H.	John	—	John	John	John
I.	Tommy	Tommy	Tommy	Billy	Billy♠
J.	Tommy	Tommy	Tommy	Boy	Tommy/Boy

♣ — due to the conventional presupposition triggered by adverb *too*.

◇ — due to the conventional presupposition triggered by adverb *back*.

♠ — Tommy is the first choice, which is later retracted.

Table 3: Preference Interactions: Facts

2. Grammatical Preferences take charge in the *absence* of relevant Commonsense Preferences.

3. The SUBJECT Antecedent Preference defeats the Grammatical Parallelism Preference when in conflict.

The cases of indeterminate final preference in examples G and J are worth noting. This kind of an indeterminate preference is infelicitous and uncooperative, which should be avoided in discourse generation. The indeterminacy in example G is due to the indeterminacy of Arnold being a normal person subject to injury or an abnormally strong person who would not let himself be injured. The indeterminacy in example J is due to the conflict between the general causal knowledge about an injury caused by hitting and the insalience of an indefinite referent as a possible pronominal referent.

6. PRONOUN INTERPRETATION PREFERENCES: ACCOUNT

Four major sources of preference have been identified in the above pronoun interpretation examples. I propose that these sources correspond to the data structures in the different components of the input and output contexts of utterance interpretation. Of the context data components outlined in section 2.3, the most relevant to the present discussion are the attentional state A, the LF register ϕ, and the discourse model D.

The main thrust of the present account is the general interaction of preferences that apply on different context components. It explains the basic fact that preferences may or may not be determinate. The present perspective of preference interactions also extends and explains the role of the attentional state in Grosz and Sidner's (1986) discourse theory.

6.1 The Role of the Attentional State

A discourse describes situations, eventualities, and entities, together with the relations among them. The attentional state A represents a dynamically updated snapshot of their *salience*. We thus assume the property *salient* to be a primitive representing the *partial order* among a set of entities in A.[13] The property *salient* is gradient and relative. A certain absolute degree of salience may not be achieved by any entities in a given A, but there is always a set of *maximally salient* entities, which is often, but not necessarily, a singleton set.[14] Thus it is crucial that a rule about the single maximally salient entity in a given A is only sometimes determinate.[15]

We will now recast some elements of the centering model in the present discourse processing architecture. In the input context C_{i-1} for utterance utt_i, the form and content (ϕ_{i-1}) of the immediately preceding utterance utt_{i-1} occupy an especially salient status. The entities realized in utt_{i-1} are among the most salient subpart of A_{i-1}. I assume that this is achieved by a general A-updating mechanism. One of the entities in A_{i-1} may be the $Center_{i-1}$, what the current discourse is *centrally about*, hence the high salience:[16]

CENTER The Center is normally more salient than other entities in the same attentional state.

At least two default linguistic hierarchies are relevant to the dynamics of salience.[17] One is the *grammatical function hierarchy* (GF ORDER), and the other is the *nominal expression type hierarchy* (EXP ORDER). The GF ORDER in utt_i predicts the relative salience of entities in the *output* attentional state A_i whereas the EXP ORDER in utt_i predicts the relative salience of entities *assumed* in the *input* attentional state A_{i-1}. EXP ORDER is also crucial to the management of the Center (EXP CENTER):

GF ORDER: Given a hierarchy, [SUBJECT > OBJECT > OBJECT2 > OTHERS], an entity realized by a higher ranked phrase is normally more salient in the output attentional state.

EXP ORDER: Given a hierarchy, [ZERO PRONOMINAL > UNSTRESSED PRONOUN > STRESSED PRONOUN > DEFINITE NP > INDEFINITE NP], an entity realized by a higher ranked expression type is normally more salient in the input attentional state.[18]

EXP CENTER: An expression of the highest ranked type normally realizes the Center in the output attentional state.

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[13]I will not discuss the partial order of propositions.

[14]Those entities that are "inaccessible" in the DRT sense do not participate in the salience ordering, or even if they do, they are below a certain minimal threshold of salience.

[15]This notion of the single maximally salient entity corresponds to the "preferred center" Cp (Grosz et al., 1986) that is determined solely by the GF ORDER. The difference here is that it is determined by *both* the Center and GF ORDER, predicting an indeterminacy in certain cases.

[16]In the centering model, the entities realized in ϕ_{i-1} are the "forward–looking centers" (Cf), and $Center_{i-1}$ is the "backward–looking center" (Cb).

[17]Consituents' linear ordering and animacy are also relevant.

[18]This order also approximates the relative salience of entities in the *output* attentional state, which is demonstrated in part in example J, but the order between the stressed and unstressed pronouns may switch. A definitive statement requires an empirical verification.

CENTER can be interpreted in two ways. One computes the "highest ranked type" per utterance, sometimes allowing a nonpronominal expression type to output the Center. The other takes it to be fixed, namely, only the zero or unstressed pronouns. The choice is empirical. In this paper, I will take the second interpretation of EXP CENTER.

Since matrix subjects and objects are inomissible in English,[19] the highest ranked expression type is the unstressed pronoun (see Kameyama, 1985:Ch.1). From EXP ORDER, it follows that an unstressed pronoun *normally* realizes a *maximally salient entity* in the input attentional state. A pronoun can also realize a submaximally salient entity if this choice is supported by another overriding preference. The grammatical features of pronouns also constrain the range of possible referents — for instance, a *he*–type entity is a male agent. The maximal salience thus applies on the suitably restricted subset of the domain for each type of pronoun.

The interactions of the above defeasible rules — CENTER, GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, and EXP CENTER — account for various descriptive generalizations. First, the SUBJECT Antecedent Preference follows from GF ORDER and EXP ORDER — SUBJECT is the highest ranked GF in the first utterance, and an unstressed pronoun in the second utterance realizes the maximally salient entity in the input *A*. Second, the coreference and noncoreference preferences in pronominal chains are accounted for. The strong coreference preference for a SUBJECT–SUBJECT pronominal chain (example K) comes from the fact that a SUBJECT Center is the single maximally salient entity, which leads to a determinate preference. In contrast, an OBJECT Center competes with the SUBJECT non–Center for the maximal salience, which leads to an indeterminate preference based on salience alone (example L). The indeterminacy is resolved, to some extent, by the Grammatical Parallelism Preference (section 6.2).

The center transition types of "establishing" and "chaining" (Kameyama, 1985;1986) result from the interactions of CENTER, EXP ORDER and EXP CENTER.[20] The Center is "established" when a pronoun picks a salient non–Center in the input context and makes it the Center in the output context. It is "chained" when a pronoun picks the Center in the input context and makes it the Center in the output context. Examples A–H are thus concerned with Center–establishing pronouns whereas examples I–L are concerned with Center–chaining pronouns. These transition types are not the primitives that directly drive preferences, however.

6.2 The Role of the LF Register

The grammatical parallelism of two adjacent utterances in discourse affects the preferred interpretation of pronouns (Kameyama, 1986), tense (Kameyama, Passonneau, and Poesio, 1993), and ellipses (Pruest, 1991; Kehler, 1993). This general tendency warrants a separate statement. Parallelism is achieved, in the present account, by a computation on the pair of logical forms, one in the LF register in the context, and the other being interpreted.

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[19]Except in a telegraphic register.

[20]What I have previously called *retain* is now called *chain*. It covers both CONTINUE and RETAIN (Grosz et al., 1986; Brennan et al., 1987).

PARA: The LF register in the input context and the ILF being interpreted seek maximal parallelism.[21]

The present perspective of rule interaction explains the "property–sharing" constraint on Center–chaining (Kameyama, 1986) as follows. GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, and PARA join forces to create a strong grammatical preference for SUBJECT–SUBJECT coreference (examples D,K). When they are in conflict, that is, when the maximally salient entity is not in a parallel position, PARA is defeated (examples A,B). When maximal salience is indeterminate, the parallelism preference affects the choice (example L), leading to a noncoreference preference for an OBJECT–SUBJECT pronominal chain.

6.3 The Role of the Discourse Model

The discourse model contains a set of information states about situations, eventualities, entities, and the relations among them. It also contains the evolving discourse structure, temporal structure, and event structure. Both linguistic semantics and commonsense preferences apply on the same discourse model.

Lexically Triggered Presuppositions. Adverbs *too* and *back* trigger conventional presuppositions about the input discourse model. These presuppositions are part of lexical semantics, thus indefeasible.

Adverb *too* triggers a presupposition that appears to seek parallelism between an utterance in the context and the utterance being interpreted. This is actually due to a general *similarity* presupposition associated with *too*. Consider each of the following utterances immediately preceding "John hit Bill too": "Mary hit Bill", "John hit Mary", "Mary kicked Bill", "John kicked Mary", "Mary hit Jane", and ?"John called Bill". What's construed as 'similar' in each case is a function of the particular utterance pair, and intuitively, preferred pairs support more similarities. Thus similarity comes in degrees, and a parallel interpretation is due to the preference for a maximal similarity.

Adverb *back* triggers a presupposition for a *reverse* parallelism. That is, the utterance "Bill hit John back" presupposes that it occurred after "John hit Bill".

Commonsense Knowledge. In contrast to the above rules that belong to the linguistic knowledge, the commonsense knowledge consists of all what an ordinary speaker knows about the world and life. Formalizing common sense is a major research goal of AI, where nonmonotonic reasoning has been intensively studied. My goal here is not to propose a new approach to commonsense reasoning but simply to highlight its interaction with linguistic pragmatics in the overall pragmatics subsystem. We know one thing for sure — there will be a relatively small number of linguistic pragmatic rules that systematically interact with an open–ended mass of commonsense rules. Since the linguistic rules can be seen to *control* commonsense inferences, our aim is to describe the former as fully as possible, and specify how the "control mechanism" works. The commonsense rules posited in connection to the examples in this paper are thus meant to be exemplary. There will be different rules for each new example and domain to be treated. The linguistic rules, however, should be stable across examples and domains.

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[21]This statement is intentionally left vague. For a specific definition of parallelism, Pruest's (1992) MSCD operation is a general definition of parallelism preference, and my property–sharing constraint (Kameyama, 1986) is a subcase relevant to pronoun interpretation.

	ATT	LF	WK	SEM	Winner
A.	John	Bill	unclear	—	ATT
B.	Bill	John	unclear	—	ATT
C.	John	Bill	unclear	Bill	SEM
D.	John–Bill?	John–Bill	unclear	—	LF
E.	John–Bill?	John–Bill	unclear	Bill–John	SEM
K.	Babar	Babar	unclear	—	ATT+LF
L.	Baker/Babar	Baker	unclear	—	ATT+LF
F.	John	John	Bill	—	WK
G.	John	John	John/Arnold	—	WK
H.	John	John	John	—	WK
I.	Tommy	Tommy	Billy	—	WK (with difficulty)
J.	Tommy	Tommy	Boy(/Tommy)	—	??

Rules: ATT={CENTER, GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, EXP CENTER},
LF={PARA}, WK={HIT, ETC}, SEM={TOO, BACK}.

Table 4: Preference Interactions: Account

The single powerful causal knowledge at work in our examples is that hitting may cause injury on the hittee but less likely on the hitter:

HIT: When an agent x hits an agent y, y is normally hurt.

The effects of the Terminator and Arnold indicate that the applicability of the HIT rule depends on the normality of the agents involved. Relevant knowledge includes things like: An agent is normally vulnerable, Arnold is a normal agent or an abnormally strong agent, and Terminator is an abnormally strong agent.

6.4 Account of the Rule Interactions

We now state the defeat patterns of competing preferences observed in Table 3 above. The SUBJECT Antecednet Preference and Pronominal Chain Preference result from CENTER, GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, and EXP CENTER. These are the defeasible *Attentional Rules* (ATT) stating the preferred attentional state transitions. The Grammatical Parallelism Preference is PARA. This is an example of the defeasible *LF Rules* (LF) stating the preferred LF transitions. Conventional presuppositions triggered by *too* and *back* are examples of the indefeasible *Semantic Rules* (SEM) in the grammar constraining the interpretation in the discourse model. The causal knowledge of hitting is HIT, with associated knowledge ETC about agents, Terminator, and Arnold. These are examples of the defeasible *Commonsense Rules* (WK) stating the preferred discourse model. Table 4 shows the defeat patterns for the *final* interpretation in examples A–L.

General Features. The first distinction among these rules is defeasibility. The SEM rules are indefeasible whereas all other rules are defeasible. It is predicted that indefeasible rules override everything else, as verified in examples C and E.

What factor determines the defeat pattern among the defeasible rules? The three context components — discourse model D, attentional state A, and LF register ϕ — all have their preferred transitions. The D preference results from *proposition-level* (or "sentence-level")

inferences *directly* determining the preferred model whereas the *A* and LF preferences result from *entity–level* (or "term–level") inferences only *indirectly* determining the preferred model. For example, the ATT and LF preference that the pronoun refers to John in "He was injured" indirectly leads to the preference that *John was injured*. This preference determines the overall preference if there are no sentence–level preferences. Otherwise, it may come in conflict with the sentence–level preference, *Bill was injured*, that directly follows from the WK rules. In such cases, we have observed that the latter WK preference wins at the end (with a varying degree of difficulty). These characterize the "flow of preference" during an utterance interpretation illustrated below:

- $[_S[_{NP}\text{he}]:\{\text{John}>\text{Bill}\} \text{ was injured}] \implies$ John was injured

- $[_S[_{NP}\text{he}]:\{\text{John}>\text{Bill}\} \text{ was injured}]:\{ \text{ Bill was injured}>\text{John was injured}\} \implies$ Bill was injured.

Conflict Resolution Patterns. We see a straightforward defeat pattern in examples A–H involving Center–establishing pronouns: *WK defeats ATT*, and *ATT defeats LF*. A natural way to state this pattern is in terms of dynamic turns — preference rules are evaluated in turn, the later ones overriding the earlier ones — using the dynamic composition operator (;) (van Benthem et al., 1993): *LF*; *ATT*; *WK*. This is the pattern of "changing preferences" in the course of utterance interpretation. Examples I–L involving Center–chaining pronouns show more or less the same defeat pattern except that the defeating gets more difficult in some cases. The "retraction" observed in example I still fits the pattern *LF*; *ATT*; *WK*, but the increased difficulty in *ATT*; *WK* (WK reversing the ATT conclusion) does not show here. The final indeterminacy in example J also cannot be accurately expressed. These examples show that WK's overriding is also defeasible.

Lascarides and Asher (1993) illustrate patterns of defeasible rule interactions in the context integration of utterances in discourse. The two inference patterns most relevant here are Nixon Diamond and Penguin Principle defined below using Asher and Morreau's (1993) Commonsense Entailment (CE) logic ($\phi \to \psi$ means "if ϕ, then indefeasibly ψ," and $\phi > \psi$ means "if ϕ, then normally ψ."):

Nixon Diamond A conflict is unresolved resulting in an ambiguity or incoherence.

- $\phi > \chi \land \psi > \neg\chi \supset \phi, \psi > \chi \land \neg\chi.$

Penguin Principle A conflict is resolved by the more specific principle defeating the more general one.[22]

- $\phi \to \psi \land \phi > \chi \land \psi > \neg\chi \supset \phi, \psi > \chi.$

On their account, any resolution of a conflict between two defeasible rules should be a case of Penguin Principle. Is it borne out in the conflict resolution patterns observed in pronoun interpretation?

There may be a remote conceptual connection between the Penguin Principle and the pattern *LF*; *ATT*; *WK* in the following line — linguistic preferences (ATT and LF) tend to be

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[22]It follows from Cautious Monotonicity:$\phi \to \psi \land \phi > \chi \supset \phi, \psi > \chi$ because $\phi \land \psi \leftrightarrow \phi.$

more abstract than commonsense preferences (WK) about particular types of eventualities, so the more specific support wins (Kameyama et al., 1993). However, the LF, ATT, and WK rules apply on different data structures, and cannot always be reduced to an indefeasible implication ($\phi \to \psi$) as required in the Penguin Principle. For instance, $hittee(x)$ can be $subject(x)$ or $\neg subject(x)$ depending on the sentence structure, so we cannot say that $hittee(x)$ implies $\neg subject(x)$ to derive the defeat pattern in example F. Specificity override does play a role in some cases, however — for instance, the knowledge about specific agents, Terminator and Arnold, override the generic causal knowledge about hitting (example G and H). Specificity override is thus only one of the various sources of conflict resolution. What other conflict resolution inferences do we have then?

There are two additional conflict resolution patterns observed in the present examples — the *Indefeasible Override* and the *Defeasible Override*. The former follows from the monotonicity of classical implication ($\phi \to \chi \supset \phi, \psi \to \chi$). The latter uses a new operator of *dynamic override* (;), where $\phi; \psi$ means "ψ overrides ϕ." These inference patterns are defined below using the CE formalism as a theoretical meta–formalism:

Indefeasible Override An indefeasible principle overrides a defeasible one.

- $\phi \to \chi \land \psi > \neg\chi \supset \phi, \psi \to \chi.$

Defeasible Override Given an explicit overriding relation, one defeasible principle defeats another (even when $\psi > \neg\chi$).

- $\psi; \phi \land \phi > \chi \supset \phi, \psi > \chi.$

The Indefeasible Override predicts the fact that the SEM rules defeat all the defeasible rules (examples C and E). The Defeasible Override enables us to state the general defeat pattern $LF; ATT; WK$ while allowing a varying degree of difficulty for WK to override a conflicting ATT preference. While it is desirable if an overriding behavior is inherent in the formalism rather than being stipulated, the use of ';' here gives us a descriptive means to state a generalization before we know the exact logical principle underlying the overriding pattern.

7. A LOGICAL MODEL: PRIORITIZED CIRCUMSCRIPTION

The above theoretical account is well–defined enough to admit a logical formulation. The desired logic is a *dynamic preference predicate logic* with a well–defined notion of the *preferred model* and a natural way to state the context transition dynamics. We can try an extension of any existing nonmonotonic logic. One example I use here is a combination of *prioritized circumscription* (Lifschitz, 1989) and *context logic* (McCarthy, 1993). Circumscription gives us a preference for a model of minimal abnormality, prioritization gives us a way to explicitly prioritize different types of defaults even when no clear specificity preference is formulatable, and the context logic enables us to state context–dependence in terms of a primitive construct. We thus explore a link between linguistic pragmatics and AI.

7.1 Circumscription

Minimal Models. McCarthy (1980,1986) proposed the use of *circumscription* for formalizing commonsense knowledge. Circumscription, in essence, is a way to minimize abnormality by assuming the default as long as there is no information to the contrary. For example,

consider a blocks world, where we know that (B1) a block is normally on the table, (B2) a block's color is normally white, (B3) block B is red, (B4) nothing can be both white and red. The formalization of this knowledge should lead us to conclude that, by default, all blocks other than B are white and that all blocks are on the table.

Abnormality Predicates. Abnormality predicates (e.g., $ab1, ab2$) are used to represent exceptions for different dimensions of normality. The following are the axioms corresponding to the above knowledge (B1)–(B4):

(B1) $block(x) \land \neg ab1(x) \supset ontable(x)$ (blocks are normally on the table)

(B2) $block(x) \land \neg ab2(x) \supset white(x)$ (blocks are normally white)

(B3) $block(B), red(B)$

(B4) $\neg(white(x) \land red(x))$

(B1) states the default position of blocks, where the abnormality predicate $ab1$ is used for any abnormal position. (B2) states the default color of blocks, where $ab2$ is used for any abnormal color. McCarthy's method is to *circumscribe* $ab1$ and $ab2$, that is, assume their "minimality" within the restrictions expressed by the axioms.

Policy Axioms. Different minimality conditions are expressed in the *policy axioms* of the *circumscriptive theory* (McCarthy, 1986). The language of a circumscriptive theory is a first–order language — it consists of a finite set $\mathcal{F}$ of function constants and a finite set $\mathcal{P}$ of predicate constants (where object constants are treated as 0–ary function constants). For any n–ary function or predicate constant $C \in \mathcal{F} \cup \mathcal{P}$, the policy axiom V_{PC} says that C *is varied as P is minimized*. The axiom V_{PP} is used when P is one of the predicates that we want to minimize.

In the above blocks world example, the function and predicate constants are

$$\mathcal{F}=B, \ \mathcal{P}=block, ontable, white, red, ab1, ab2$$

The circumscriptive theory T in this example is the axiom set consisting of (B1)-(B4) above and the following policy axioms (B5)–(B6):

(B5) $V[ab1 : ab1, ontable]$
       ($ab1$ is minimized)(*ontable* is allowed to vary while minimizing $ab1$)

(B6) $V[ab2 : ab2, white, red]$
       ($ab2$ is minimized)(*white* and *red* are allowed to vary while minimizing $ab2$)

The theorems of T are:

(B7) $(\forall x)\neg ab1(x)$ (nothing has an abnormal position)
       $(\forall x)(ab2(x) \supset x = B)$ (B is the only block with an abnormal color)

As a formalism for defeasible reasoning, the set of theorems of a circumscriptive theory depends on the set of its axioms nonmonotonically. Some theorems may be lost when axioms are added. For example, when the formula $\neg ontable(B)$ is added to the axiom set, the conclusion $\forall x \neg ab1(x)$ must be retracted.

Priorities. When a predicate is allowed to vary while minimizing more than one abnormality predicates, multiple conflicting models may arise (i.e., Nixon Diamond). For instance, the well–known case of a Quaker and Republican has the following axioms:

(Q1) $quaker(x) \land \neg ab1(x) \supset pacifist(x)$ (Quakers are normally pacifists)

(Q2) $republican(x) \land \neg ab2(x) \supset \neg pacifist(x)$ (Republicans are normally not pacifists)

(Q3) $V[ab1 : ab1, pacifist]$
   ($ab1$ is minimized) (*pacifist* is allowed to vary while minimizing $ab1$)

(Q4) $V[ab2 : ab2, pacifist]$
   ($ab2$ is minimized) (*pacifist* is allowed to vary while minimizing $ab2$)

(Q5) $quaker(A)$, $republican(A)$ (A is both a quaker and a republican)

Note that these facts lead to a contradiction that A is both a pacifist and not a pacifist. Relative *priorities* among abnormality predicates resolve such conflicts. For instance, we can set a higher priority to minimize $ab2$.

(Q4′) $V[ab2 : ab2, ab1, pacifist]$
   ($ab1$ can be varied as $ab2$ is minimized)

With (Q4′), $\neg ab2(x)$ is preferred over $\neg ab1(x)$, that is, a non–pacifist Quaker is preferred to a pacifist Republican. We thus resolve the conflict and decide that A is not a pacifist. Prioritization intuitively depends on what "aspect" of the world is of more relevance or more minimal. This example then makes the political aspect more relevant to the religious aspect.

 Context. Context has recently become the object of formalization in and of itself. According to McCarthy (1993), a major AI goal of this formalization is to allow simple axioms for commonsense phenomena, e.g., axioms for static blocks world situations, to be *lifted* to contexts involving fewer assumptions, e.g., to contexts in which situations change. Then the axioms would be included in general commonsense databases to be used in inferences. In his formalism, $ist(c, p)$ expresses the intuition that p is true in context c. One can *enter* the context c to get a context–internal view p, from which one can *leave* or *lift* the implicit context and get $ist(c, p)$.

7.2 Possible Formalization of Pragmatic Principles

In formalizing the theoretical account presented in the previous section, we need to establish a number of basic correspondences between the logical and theoretical primitives. First we take the first–order language of circumscription to be the language of our discourse theory. Variables stand for entities and events realized by linguistic expressions. Second, we directly reference an utterance and its input and output contexts with the various components with indices — for instance, as utt_i, $C_{i-1} = \langle \phi_{i-1}^k, D_{i-1}, A_{i-1}, I_{i-1}, L, K \rangle$, and $C_i = \langle \phi_i^k, D_i, A_i, I_i, L, K \rangle$. Third, we translate various preference rules into default conditional statements with abnormality predicates. Fourth, explicit priorities among minimizing predicates implement the override relations expressed with ';' above. Absence of priorities leads to no resolution of conflict. The following illustrates how it might work for the above examples.

 Attentional Axioms. Attentional axioms include GF ORDER, EXP ORDER, and CENTER (simplified below). The abnormality predicate $ab2$ is supposed to compute the markedness of a phrase, and $ab3$ computes the attentional abnormality of a Center entity though the details of these computations are left open.

ATT 1 *(GF ORDER:)* $Subj(matrix(\phi_i)) = x \land Obj(matrix(\phi_i)) = y \land \neg ab2(x)$
$\supset ist(A_i, more\_salient(x, y))$ *(the matrix subject normally realizes an entity that is more salient than the entity realized by the matrix object in the output attentional state)*

ATT 2 *(EXP ORDER:)* $ist(\Phi_i, pro(x)) \wedge \neg ab2(x)$
$\supset \neg \exists y.ist(A_{i-1}, more\_salient(y, x))$ *(an unstressed pronoun normally realizes the maximally salient entity in the input attentional state)*

ATT 3 *(CENTER:)* $ist(A_i, Center(x)) \wedge ist(A_i, \neg Center(y)) \wedge \neg ab3(x)$
$\supset ist(A_i, more\_salient(x, y))$

LF Axioms. LF axioms include PARA (simplified below). The predicate $ab4$ computes the structural abnormality of an utterance.

LF 1 *(PARA:)* $\neg ab4(\Phi_i) \supset parallel(\phi_{i-1}, \Phi_i)$ *(an utterance is normally structurally parallel to the immediately preceding utterance)*

LF 2 *(PARALLELISM:)*

$parallel(\phi_{i-1}, \phi_i) \supset$
$\quad\quad [Subj(matrix(\phi_{i-1})) = Subj(matrix(\Phi_i)) \wedge Obj(matrix(\phi_{i-1})) = Obj(matrix(\Phi_i))]$
$\quad\quad \vee \, Subj(matrix(\phi_{i-1})) = Subj(matrix(\Phi_i))$
$\quad\quad \vee \, Obj(matrix(\phi_{i-1})) = Obj(matrix(\Phi_i))$

(for two utterances to be parallel, either their matrix subjects realize the same entity or their matrix objects realize the same entity or both.)

Commonsense Axioms. Commonsense axioms are open–ended. The following is the HIT rule and other relevant knowledge. The abnormality predicate $ab1$ is used for an agent's abnormality, which is interpreted here to mean an agent's invulnerability.

WK 1 *(HIT:)* $agent(x) \wedge agent(y) \wedge hit(e) \wedge Agent(e, x) \wedge Theme(e, y) \wedge Time(e, t) \wedge \neg ab1(y) \supset$
$\wedge injured(e') \wedge Theme(e', y) \wedge Time(e', t') \wedge t \preceq t'$ *(if an agent hits a normal agent, the hittee is injured afterwards)*

WK 2 *(AGENT:)* $agent(x) \wedge \neg ab1(x) \supset vulnerable(x)$ *(an agent is normally vulnerable)*

WK 3 *(ARNOLD1:)* $x = arnold \supset agent(x) \wedge \neg ab1(x)$ *(Arnold is a normal agent)*

WK 4 *(ARNOLD2:)* $x = arnold \supset agent(x) \wedge ab1(x)$ *(Arnold is an abnormal agent)*

WK 5 *(TERMINATOR:)* $terminator(x) \supset agent(x) \wedge ab1(x)$ *(Terminator is an abnormal agent)*

Policy Axioms. The following are the policy axioms involving the above abnormality predicates — $ab1$ for an agent abnormality, $ab2$ for a phrase abnormality, $ab3$ for a Center abnormality, and $ab4$ for an utterance abnormality.

POLICY 1 $V[ab1 : ab1, agent]$
(ab1 is minimized)(agent is allowed to vary while minimizing ab1)

POLICY 2 $V[ab2 : ab2, more\_salient]$

POLICY 3 $V[ab3 : ab3, more\_salient]$

POLICY 4 $V[ab4 : ab4, parallel]$

Conflicts in minimizing abnormality predicates are resolved by prioritizing them. One policy axiom states the priority of the agent abnormality $ab1$ over the phrasal abnormality $ab2$ over the utterance structure abnormality $ab4$:

POLICY 5 $V[ab1 : ab1, ab2, ab4, agent, more\_salient, parallel]$

The above set of axioms account for the preferences observed in examples A–B and F–H. In examples A and B, ATT 1 and ATT 2 lead to the preference for the SUBJECT antecedent assuming a normal SUBJECT ($\neg ab2(x)$), and this goes through because no WK axioms are applicable. In example F, the SUBJECT preference is defeated by WK 1 because "Bill" is a normal agent ($\neg ab1(bill)$) in the minimal model and $ab1$ has a higher priority than $ab2$ to minimize (POLICY 3). In example G, the outcome is indeterminate because of the split between WK 3 (Arnold is normal) and WK 4 (Arnold is abnormal). The fact that WK 4 ($ab2(arnold)$) overrides WK 1 shows an instance of the Penguin Principle resolving a conflict. In example H, WK 5 (the Terminator is abnormal) overrides WK 1 analogously. Examples F–H show that a specific WK preference dictates the final interpretation. When no WK axioms are relevant, the ATT and LF axioms dictate the interpretation.

A separate policy axiom states the priority of the Center abnormality $ab3$ over the utterance structure abnormality $ab4$:

POLICY 6 $V[ab3 : ab3, ab4, more\_salient, parallel]$

A conflict between between $ab2$ and $ab3$ is unresolved, predicting the indeterminate preference when in conflict (recall the Object–Center case). A conflict between $ab1$ and $ab3$ is not resolved either, which would capture the retract–override processing difficulty of example I in terms of a Nixon Diamond. However, this would fail to predict the fact that, given enough time to think, the final interpretation conforms to the one supported by the specific WK axioms.

Another intuition that is not captured by the predicate–level prioritization is the general defeat pattern such as $LF; ATT; WK$ in terms of *groups* of rules. Since the function and predicate constants in WK rules are generally disjoint from those in ATT and LF rules, the rule interaction may be better suited for formalization in terms of *group prioritization* (e.g., Grosof, 1991), where priorities *within* and *across* rule groups are composed to generate the overall defeat pattern. This is a topic for future investigations.

8. Further Questions

There are a number of questions that are related to the present topic but have not been discussed. The first are *logical questions*. What are the connections with *update logics* (e.g., Veltman, 1993)? We can see that the grammar subsystem supports *straight updating* whereas the pragmatics subsystem supports *preferential updating* or *upgrading* (van Benthem et al., 1993). The preference defeat patterns discussed here may be formulatable as a change of preferences over the course of utterance interpretation within the proposed utterance interpretation architecture. That would force precise definitions of fine–grained conflict resolution patterns in upgrading. Can my proposal be couched in a system of *dynamic preferential logic* that combines elements of dynamic semantic theories and preferential models (e.g., McCarthy, 1980; Shoham, 1988)?

There are also *computational questions*. The undecidability of predicate circumscription is well–known (Davis, 1980). Does the proposed discourse processing architecture with explicit

contextual control of inferences actually *help manage* the computational complexity of the pragmatics rule interactions?

Finally, a *cognitive question* — Does the proposed discourse processing architecture naturally extend to a more elaborate many–person discourse model that addresses the issue of coordinating different *private* contexts?

9. CONCLUSIONS

A discourse processing architecture with desirable computational properties consists of a grammar subsystem representing the space of possibilities and a pragmatics subsystem representing the space of preferences. Underspecified logical forms proposed in the computational literature define the grammar–pragmatics boundary. Utterance interpretation induces a complex interaction of defeasible rules in the pragmatics subsystem. Upon scrutiny of a set of examples involving intersentential pronominal anaphora, I have identified different groups of defeasible rules that determine the preferred transitions of different components of the dynamic context. There are grammatical preferences inducing fast entity–level inferences only indirectly suggesting the preferred discourse model, and commonsense preferences inducing slow proposition–level inferences directly determining the preferred discourse model. The attentional state in the context supports the formulation of attentional rules that significantly affect pronoun interpretation preferences. The observed patterns of conflict resolution among interacting preferences are predicted by a small set of inference patterns including the one that explicitly states the overriding relation between rule groups. In general, I hope that this paper has made clear some of the *actual* complexities of interacting preferences in linguistic pragmatics, and that the discussion has made them sufficiently sorted out for further logical implementations.

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