Stichting
MATHEMATISCH CENTRUM
2e Boerhaavestraat 49,
Amsterdam

Unesco enquiry into current ideological conflicts, an essay towards the conceptual analysis of terms used in ideological conflicts

Prof. dr. D. van Dantzig

1951
UNESCO

ENQUIRY INTO CURRENT IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS,
AN ESSAY TOWARDS THE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
OF TERMS USED IN IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS

by Prof. Dr. D. van Dantzig

1. An enquiry into the function of words used in ideological conflicts can only be of little moment, if it restricts itself to an investigation of their relations with other words, or even their relations with objects, events or situations represented by them. Questions as to whether two definitions of the term 'democracy' are in accordance with each other, or even whether this term is "justly" or "unjustly" applied to a specified form of government are in themselves of little importance. As to the latter question this is the more so the case, if the valuations upon which the distinction between "justly" and "unjustly" is based, remain unmentioned. Such an enquiry can only be helpful in classifying the nature of the conflicts, if the function of a word is considered as a relation in a triple respect: 1º to other words, 2º to objects (or situations or occurrences, actions, etc.) denoted by them, 3º to subjects (persons or groups of persons) using them or influenced by them. Whereas in logic the relations 1º and in empirical sciences the relations 2º are the most important ones, here the relations 3º will be the most relevant ones.

The most elementary form of the phenomena which we have to investigate can therefore not be a single word with its linguistic or etymological properties, nor a sentence or a more extensive system of words with its logical or syntactical properties, nor even the semantical relations between words and objects (e.g. 'denotation', 'designation' etc.), but only an action consisting in the actual use of words. Such an action will be called an act of discourse. With regard
jects concerned with an act of discourse, we can, if it is of
oral form, distinguish the speaker(s) and the listener(s).
These terms will be used in a metaphorical extension, also if
the act of discourse is not of an oral nature, so that the term
'speaker' will be used also for a "writer", "singer", "actor", "player", "painter", etc. and the term 'listener' for
"reader" and other persons observing the act or indirectly in-
fluenced by it. Generally we shall call the speaker's aspects
of an act of discourse all phenomena which can be considered
as having influenced the act (i.e. having contributed to it
as causes) and the listener's aspects all phenomena which can be
be considered as having been influenced by it. If e.g. the act
of discourse under consideration is an interview given by a
statesman to a press-man, not only the latter counts as a
listener, but also the readers of the interview when published,
or persons having heard about it, without actually having heard
it, etc.

In the same way we count as speakers (or, if the distinction
is necessary, as co-speakers) e.g. the civil servant who has
drawn up the text of the interview or parts of it, the
superiors or colleagues of the statesman, with whom he has
discussed the text or the desirability or opportunity of the
interview, etc. Among the listener's aspects we have also to
counter the influence the act of discourse has on the speaker
himself, whose further behaviour may partially be altered by
it. Just so the speaker's aspects comprehend actions of the
listener(s) also, e.g. his actually listening, or his be-

Although conceptual research should preferably be done
in an experimental way by observing actual acts of discourse,
the means and methods for such observations often fail. In
the majority of cases we therefore have to be content with
a semi-empirical investigation, which consists in combining parts of the numerous acts of discourse actually observed into a "fictitious" one. Our general experience is often quite sufficient to imagine, how, under given circumstances such an act would develop.

2. It needs hardly be said that the speaker's aspects of an act of discourse often differ greatly from the listener's aspects. If e.g. a statesman - as has been done in both world-wars - propagates in a speech that his country should go to war "in order to make the world free for democracy", the latter term may, and often does, have quite a different meaning for him than for the hearer, who, convinced (or persuaded) by his speech actually enlists. If the war is won and if the soldier comes back and does not find "democracy" (as he understood it), for which the world should be free now, realised, he may feel deceived and call the statesman a demagogue. Sometimes rather unjustly, because the latter may not have been very well aware at all of any difference between his views on the nature of "democracy" and his audience's.

Such an act of discourse may be said to have been a failure, at least in a considerable part of its listener's aspects, because the expectations the listener(s) had with regard to the consequences of his behaving according to the speaker's advice were not fulfilled because of an unnoticed difference between the interpretations of the speaker's words. Maybe the listener, if he had better understood the speaker's interpretation, would not have enlisted, or perhaps even actually have opposed his country's participating in the war. Maybe the speaker, if he had actually foreseen the listener's later disillusion, would have used other arguments fitting in better with the latter's actual desires. But maybe also, of course, the speaker knew about the discrepancy between the interpretations and deliberately made use of it in order to attain his ends. In such a case the listener may easily
the speaker afterwards with "misuse" of the term 'democracy', although the latter may feel quite justified about his way of using it, as it is e.g. in accordance with definitions given by several well-known authors.

Again, the question whether such a listener was "justified" or not in stamping such a speaker's use of the term 'democracy' as a 'misuse' is just as unimportant as the question whether the speaker was "justified" or not in stamping the political, social and/or economic structure of the country expected by him a 'democracy'. The listener thinks the speaker "misused" the term 'democracy', and the speaker thinks the (former) listener "misused" the term 'misuse'.

The important thing is the fact that the speaker and the listener both used the term 'democracy' as designating a structure they approved of, but that the observable characteristics a structure should have in order that they would approve of it, were different.

Conceptual research should for these reasons not be restricted - as it is often done - to the comparison of the different speakers' aspects of words in different acts of discourse (e.g. different definitions given in books by political scientists or in speeches by politicians or statesmen, etc.) but should take into account also, or even in the first place, the different listeners' aspects and the differences between speaker's and listener's aspects. Moreover these aspects should not be restricted to the objects designated by the words according to speaker and listener, but should include also their valuations of such objects, and their efforts to change situations they observe.

A word (or a group of words) used in different acts of discourse shows some variability within the speaker's and within the listener's aspects as well as between the speaker's and the listener's aspects. This variability in its different
forms will be called the 'dispersion' of the word. Although we do not possess any precise definition, nor of measuring or precisely estimating the degrees of dispersion of different terms, we can roughly distinguish terms with "large" from terms with "small" dispersion. This could be done somewhat more precisely, e.g. within the listener's aspects by studying the variability in reactions of test-persons when hearing the word in various contexts and circumstances.

3. A word within some context generally has some descriptive function (or content), i.e. its relation to the constatations of conformity and disparity by speaker(s) and listener(s). It also has often some emotive function (or content), i.e. its relation to the emotions of speaker(s) and listener(s). In so far as it is related to emotions of preference, it will be said metaphorically to have a 'positive' and in so far as it is related to emotions of aversion a 'negative charge'. It often occurs, in particular in political discussions, that two words have practically the same descriptive function, but contrasting emotive functions. This happens if they are used to describe a same object (under which term we subsume also a situation or an occurrence, etc.) by persons oppositely affected by it. (Examples: 'heroic' - 'reckless'; 'to sustain authority' - 'to oppress'; 'warrior for right and liberty' - 'rebel', 'insurgent', 'mischief-maker' etc.

It is a general experience in conceptual analysis that a person applying a term with strong emotive function to a situation by which he is profoundly affected, will not admit, will not even understand that its 'opposite' has the same or almost the same descriptive function. It is only by applying the term to cases which are very remote from the source of affection that one can make him sometimes see the conformity of the descriptive functions. But even then it happens in the
majority of cases that he will transpose the source of affection to the remote case also, and apply to it its double valuation.

This difficulty is increased by the fact that some difference in descriptive function often remains. To take a rather clear example: not every "warrior for justice and liberty" will be called by his enemy a 'mischief-maker' and still less will every "mischief-maker" be called a 'warrior for justice and liberty' by his admirers.

The relation between such terms is rather of a correlative nature: in a large number of acts of discourse where one of the terms is applied to an object by persons positively affected by it the other (or another analogous) term will be applied to the same object by persons negatively affected by it.

This, of course raises the question, in how far it is possible to attribute to the distinction between descriptive and emotive functions a scientific character, i.e., in how far it is independent of the emotions of the investigator himself. It would lead us too far, however, to go into this question here.

Closely connected with the emotive function of a word, and originally (cf. 18) not clearly distinguished from it, is its volitive function \(^{19}\) i.e., its relation to the speaker's and listener's volitions, in particular to their momentary expectations of their own future behaviour \(^{20}\). It comprises in particular the speaker's expectations of the change in the hearer's volitions - and, of course, in the hearer's behaviour itself - which will be caused by the act of discourse. This aspect of the volitive function may be called \(^{21}\) the 'incitative function'.

Clearly some volitive and even incitative functions can be found in any act of discourse, e.g., simply by asking:
"Why does the speaker speak and why does the listener listen?"

But the difficulties mentioned above with regard to discerning the emotive function exist for the volitive function also.

4. Applying those terms to the example mentioned above concerning the difference between speaker's and listener's aspects of an act of discourse, which contained a plea for "making the world free for democracy", we can state that the speaker's and listener's aspects were in sufficient accordance with regard to the emotive content of the term 'democracy', to which both, speaker and hearer, attributed a strong positive valuation, but in discordance with regard to the descriptive content of the term, i.e. the characteristics of a structure to which they attributed the term, and also with volitive content, which for one of them may have been the desire to maintain the structure in their country as it was, and for the other to have it altered in a more or less definite way.

If instead of the word 'democracy' we had considered a description of the form of government existing in their country, which the speaker's speech might also have contained, the accordance with regard to the descriptive content may have been considerably greater (though still probably far from complete), but the same discordance which before existed with regard to the descriptive content would then have existed with regard to the emotive content. In fact, it is not necessarily linked up with the term 'democracy', or any other word at all, but it is based on different valuations of the actual structure of the state of those parts of the structure which each of them actually experiences as fundamental for his conditions of life. Anyhow this underlying difference is of an emotional nature, even if it appears as a difference concerning the descriptive content of a term.

This example shows us that it is not sufficient to investigate, whether or not the descriptive, emotive and volitive
contents agree in speaker's and listener's aspects, but that the main problem is, to find out which observations, which valuations, and which efforts are expressed by a term in the speaker's and the listener's aspects. This leads to conceptual research becoming to a considerable degree and enquiry into the political, social and economic characteristics of society which a subject experiences, his valuations of them and his efforts to maintain or to change them.

Thereby conceptual research is linked up with sociology, psychology and mass-psychology.

An enquiry into "the meaning" of a term like "democracy" thereby automatically becomes an enquiry into the ideas and the ideals, which either individual political scientists and politicians (who use the term preponderantly as speakers) or large groups of the population (using the term chiefly as listeners (readers) and only occasionally as speakers) have about the structure of society. It is only by understanding these that the controversies about terms like 'democracy' can be understood. On the other hand something about them can be learnt from these controversies. The chief importance of a conceptual analysis of terms like 'democracy' lies in the opportunity they give to find out the underlying emotions and volitions, and afterwards to express these in a clearer way than is done by these terms.

5. The main difficulty (apart from the fact that it will hardly be possible to obtain sufficient empirical material) lies in the mutual dependence of the descriptive, emotive and solitive contents.

If two subjects both are accustomed to apply or not to apply a term in accordance with each other to situations by which they are affected in the same way, they often disagree about the applicability of the term to situations which affect them otherwise. Each of them believes that this difference
is not caused by their **different affections**, but that the situation "has" or "has not" the attributes characteristic for the application of the term. I.e. if both subjects A and B apply the term to a situation $S_1$, none of them to $S_2$ and $A$ but not B to $S_3$, then the similar way in which A is affected by $S_1$ and $S_3$ may lead him to describe $S_1$ and $S_3$ similarly. Contrary to B his attention in such cases will be fixed on similarity between $S_1$ and $S_3$ and on dissimilarity between $S_2$ and $S_3$.

Example: A and B are two anti-nazi Dutchmen with opposite views on the Dutch military action in Indonesia ($S_3$). Let the term the applicability of which is considered be e.g. 'attack'. Let $S_1$ and $S_2$ be the German and Allied military operations on May 5th 1940 and June 6th 1944 respectively.

E.g. A may call $S_3$ as well as $S_1$ but not $S_2$ an "attack", by which choice of words he shows to be opposed to $S_3$, whereas B (assumed to approve of $S_3$) will apply the term to $S_1$, but not to $S_3$. A nazi would perhaps apply to $S_2$, but not to $S_1$. It is also easy to see, how A and B will apply or not apply terms like 'invasion', 'liberation', 'rebels', 'fighters for liberty', 'goodwilling elements', 'collaborators' etc. in the three cases.

Apart from this dependence of descriptive on emotive contents we mention also the dependence of volitive on descriptive contents. This is in particular of importance if, instead of direct observations, expectations of eventual future observations are concerned. Let us consider two subjects A and B, using the same descriptive terms for three eventual future situations $S_1$, $S_2$, $S_3$. Let us suppose that $S_1$ in itself affects none of them particularly, (or both in the same way) that $S_2$ affects both of them positively, $S_3$ both of them negatively, but that A expects $S_1$ to lead inevitably to $S_2$
have some influence on the occurrence of S1, their volitions towards it, will be of an opposite nature, because of its assumed consequences. Example: A and B are two "socialist" politicians. I do not try here to replace the highly emotive and vague terms by more descriptive and precise ones — S1 is an eventual future large unemployment, S2 a "weakening" and S3 a "strengthening" of the "power of capitalism". If A believes S1, to lead to S2, and B believes it to lead to S3, their behaviour towards S1 will be opposite. This difference in volitive contents induced by the different descriptive contents related to their different expectations, will, of course, usually have a further repercussion also on the descriptive contents of the terms they use, as mentioned before.

On the other hand we know, of course, that the expectations in their turn are not independent of the volitions. This generally known relation is often overstressed and even inverted by politicians, in order to try to "deduce" the volitions of their opponents from the expectations these relate leaving out of consideration other behaviouristic symptoms "He does not believe S2 to occur "hence" he does not want it").

Perhaps the most important feature of this dependence of volitive on descriptive, in particular "expectative" contents is the transfer of emotion by a subject A from an eventual future situation S2 to another S1 which he considers a necessary and/or sufficient cause of S2. This is of particular importance if A is so strongly convinced of the causal relation between S1 and S2 that he is completely unaware of it, and thereby of the emotional transfer.

He may use all his forces in order to strive for realisation of S1 and believes his positive valuation of S1 to be of a fundamental nature, whereas on pressing him to explain why
he values $1 so highly, the conceptual analyst may perhaps find out that it is only (or mainly) because he is certain of its leading to $2. This phenomenon of "expectative wishing", as it might be called in contra distinction to "wishful expectation" is, I believe, not very well studied, but, I believe, of the greatest importance in political science.

The interdependence of descriptive and emotive or volitive content is to a considerable degree effectuated by means of terms like 'real', 'true', 'necessary', 'certain' etc. We can disentangle these contents somewhat better by attributing these terms to the emotive and volitive contents, instead of to the descriptive one, as it is done usually. This, however, also leads to some difficulties, into which we do not go here.

6. Something has to be said about the purpose, the nature and the possible effects of a conceptual research into the use of political terms, as this purpose, nature and effects are seen by the present author, and, as he has reason to believe, by several other investigators, and, as he expects, by a considerable greater number of people by the time when investigations like the present one will have become better known and more generally understood.

In this sense then, the purpose of investigations like the present one is a clarification and a bringing to consciousness, of the observations, expectations, emotions and volitions underlying acts of discourse of a political nature, in order that such acts may become more successful, in particular in their listeners' aspects. I.e., in order that the numerous people who, willingly or unwillingly, have their actions influenced by political acts of discourse, will find the effects of these actions to a considerably greater degree to be in accordance with the expectations raised in them by these acts of discourse than - according to the author's and several other people's estimations - presently is the case.
This purpose, of course, is itself to some degree of a "political" nature, though of a considerably more general and less specific kind than political purposes use to be.

With regard to the nature of such an investigation the author believes it to be necessary, in order to reach this purpose, to refrain as much as possible from taking parts in the political controversies under examination, to remain "philosophically detached", as it is put in the introduction to UNESCO's questionnaire. This is of particular importance as many statements which on first sight seem to be completely "detached", on closer examination appear to imply specific valuations, expectations and volitions which are shared by one party in the controversy, so that accepting them ultimately amount in taking parts without being aware of it. This requires a most careful phrasing of one's ideas, in order to avoid as much as possible a greater preciseness or a greater intersubjectivity than is justified. A considerable effort in this direction has been made, at the cost of an unavoidable clumsiness of formulation.

Moreover the purpose we strive for, requires that we do not pay too much attention to questions, as to whether the controversial parties express their views "correctly" according to some formal scheme. An eventual constatation would not only provide us with a reason for disapproving of them, but not help us in finding the underlying emotions etc. of their adherents; "Correctness" of expression will be relevant for us primarily in our own and far less in other political and social scientists' work.

Concerning the results which can be reached by means of conceptual research, it will be good to expect too much. Some popular expectations regarding the effect of "correct" definitions of political terms are rising, which - according to the author's expectation - can only lead to
further disappointments. Political terms are vague because they express fluctuating emotions rather than steady observations, ideals rather than actual situations and vague (often even subconscious) desires rather than precise volitions. Definitions replacing the vagueness of such terms would in most cases be contrary to the views of at least one of the controversial parties, and therefore amount in taking parts in the controversy, hence be unacceptable for one party, and require the emotions, ideals and desires to find other ways of expression, hence lead to replacement of the former terms by other ones which soon would be used in just as vague a way as the original ones. This, at least, is the view of the present author. On the other hand, by finding out the underlying emotions etc., in whatever a form they are expressed, we may obtain a considerably greater insight into the active causes of the controversy, and thereby either find methods to neutralise them, or at least know better than before what we and other people really are fighting for.

It will, perhaps, be useful to consider the principal possible results of an investigation like the present one if it is resumed in some definition of a political term, e.g. "democracy," intended to restrict future usages of the term "synthetic" definition; (the situation is quite different for definitions intending only to describe past usages of the term "analytic" definition; cf. the answer to question 6).

1°. It is formulated so that it might be acceptable to all controversial parties. In order that this be possible the definition presumably would have to be either so vague, or so trivial that it would not allow any practical application. Even if it were so vague or so trivial, it were rather improbable that it would be accepted by all parties, if at least one of the parties - as in the present controversy is the case -
is emotionally so strongly bound to a definite ideology, that it declines to accept any statement which is not in complete accordance with this ideology, perhaps even insists upon a definition which expressis verbis denounces all other ideologies in one way or another.

2°. It is formulated so that it is openly contrary to the views of at least one of the parties. In that case it can be used by the other parties as a means of propaganda against this one, by denying it the "right" to call itself 'democratic'. Then the isolated party may either

a) not bother about the definition at all and stick to its structure as well as its terminology without this "right" to do so;
b) accept the definition and try to circumvent it so that it can maintain its structure and notwithstanding that call itself 'democratic' without undubiously contradicting the definition or
c) accept the definition and choose for itself some other term which by tradition is strongly associated with objects or situations arousing strong positive affects in many people.

In none of these cases the result would be very much worth while. It might nevertheless be used in order to enforce the chosen definition upon the isolated party. Most probably this would not amount in leaving the isolated party free to choose between either changing its structure or resigning from calling tertium, but in forcing it to change its structure.

In that case the struggle would apparently be fought on philosophical grounds, but actually it would only be imposing one structure upon another, which could have been done quite independent of any definition.
In any case, I think it is clear, that any effort to give a definition of 'democracy' is an action of a political, not of a philosophical nature, and therefore does not fulfill the requirements of UNESCO's Philosophical Analysis.

In science and philosophy we can according to G. Mannoury distinguish between analytic and synthetic definitions. An analytic definition of a term is (synthetically!) defined as a description of the way in which this term is actually used in acts of discourse. It is a communication to the reader, which may be correct or not, and is based on observation.

A synthetic definition on the contrary is a description of the way in which the author intends to use the term. It is a proposal to the reader to accept this usage, which may be efficacious or not (but not: correct or not) and is based on volition.

In science and philosophy such a proposal is usually accepted, at least temporarily, at least in its listener's aspect. In politics, however, this is only the case with respect to the adherents of the speaker. Here the introduction of a definite way of using words, usually is meant to result in a definite type of political behaviour. Therefore the volitive element which always is present in the acceptance of a proposal becomes here of the greatest importance: whether such a proposal will be accepted or not becomes mainly dependent upon whether the listener's purposes are coherent with or contrary to the speaker's ones. Hence in political science the distinction between analytic and synthetic definitions in a large number of cases passes into one between analytic and political definitions. An analogous remark holds for other statements than definitions.
Notes

1) "Syntaxis" according to Ch. W. Morris' (1938) terminology.

2) "Semantics" according to Ch. W. Morris' terminology.

3) Also the expressions "of little importance" in the second and "of little moment" in the first sentence have a valuative nature. They are meant to express the author's expectation, that the actions evaluated by them will have little influence on the further development of the ideological conflicts, except in as far as they might be used in a propagandistic way, which except the expression "in themselves" intends to exclude. Analogous remarks hold for analogous statements in the text.

4) "Pragmatics" according to Morris' terminology.

5) The Dutch term 'taaldaad' was introduced by G. Mannoury (1925) Other terms are: 'acte de communication' (G. Mannoury, 1947) ; 'act of intelligence' (D. van Damme, 1946) ; 'verbal act of influence' (W. Schiffer, 1945)

6) The term will be used in a generalised sense, such as to include intonation, mimic and gestures, accompanying or even replacing words.

7) The term 'speaker's aspect' and 'listener's aspect' replace. Mannoury's (1925) terms 'sprakotkenis' and 'hoorotkenis', (i.e. 'speaker's meaning' and 'hearer's meaning').

8) In such like cases a distinction between listeners (and speakers) of first, second and higher orders might sometimes be useful.

9) Or 'semiotics', 'semantics', 'signifies', 'psychologie linguistique', etc.

10) Cf. G. Mannoury's "Regroupment-law".

11) An example of such a one is the interview mentioned before.

12) We shall use the term 'object' in the wide sense, such as to include events, situations, etc. Also Cf. e.g. "Object of investigation".

13) The term 'context' is used here as a designation not only for other words, but also for other circumstances, accompanying the use of the word, in particular also the speaker(s) and listener(s)' memories of previous usages of the word and of related word and of related circumstances, as well as their corresponding expectations, emotions, etc.

14) The term 'descriptive function' replaces G. Mannoury's (1925) term 'indicatieve betekenis' (vaheur indicatieve, 1947) and is related to Ch. W. Morris' (1946) terms 'designative' and 'informative'.
15) The neologism 'to constate' as a translation of analogous terms in other languages had to be introduced, because the ordinary English translation 'to state' would lead to the noun 'statement' designating a verbal expression (e.g. of a 'constatation').

16) Equality in some respect, concord.

17) Inequality in some respect, difference, distinction.

18) The term 'emotive function' replaces G. Mannoury's (1925) term 'émotionelle bežeknia' (i.e. 'Emotional meaning', also 'valour émotive', 1946) and is related to Norris's terms 'appensive' and 'valuative'. I do not try here to define terms like 'emotion', 'valuation', 'volition', 'observation', 'memory', 'expectation' etc.

19) G. Mannoury, 1937, 'volitionelle Bedeutung'.

20) Cf. G. Mannoury (1946): auto-behaviour-expectations. It remains to be seen, however, whether they are sufficient to serve as a base for the current- and also for our own - way of using the terms related to phenomena of 'willing'.

21) After Ch.W. Morris, 1946 cf. also his term 'prescriptive'. Morris's term 'formative' and 'systemic' correspond with our term 'formal' (1946), which need not be introduced here. His distinction between 'uses' and 'types' of signifying seems to correspond more or less with our distinction between speaker's and listener's aspects, the latter being replaced by some kind of averages somewhat corresponding with the lexicological 'meaning' of a term. I don't think it necessary to have two different groups of 4 terms for the 'uses' and the 'types' of signifying separately.

22) This case is more or less dual to the even more frequent one, where A explicitly states the causal dependence of S2 on S1 in order to hide (or whilst being unaware of) his positive emotional attitude towards S1 itself.

23) With respect to the term 'real' and its 'word-family' cf. some remarks in the answer to question 7.

24) Except in the improbable case where one would succeed in finding one which were simultaneously acceptable to all parties as well as sufficiently precise.
I don't think the attribute of the term 'democracy' considered in the questionnaire is very well described by means of the term 'ambiguous'. The latter term, it seems to me, is mostly used if the term under consideration (i.e., 'democracy') has a considerable indicative function, and if its domain of dispersion clearly consists of two separate domains, in each of which the term has relatively small dispersion. In other words: if it designates almost always one out of two rather clearly delimited groups of objects (or events, situations, etc.) whereas it is not clear, which of the two groups is meant in some important cases.

In as far as the term 'democracy' has any descriptive function, viz in as far as it designates types of political, economic and/or social structures of nations, and in as far as these structures can be grouped in (one of) two groups, the type of structure also within each of these groups is still so variable, that the dispersion within each group remains very large, even to such a degree, that the distinction between the two groups is far from clear and can only be maintained by criteria rather different from those one tries to describe by means of the term 'democracy'. (Criteria like the existence of treaties with the leading nations in the two groups; the support given in crucial cases in the security council by representatives of the nations to proposals by representatives of the leading nations, etc.)

Moreover the main function of the term 'democracy' seems to me to be rather of an emotive and a volitive than of a descriptive nature.

The term is used in most cases with a positive valuation; the Nazis usually did not use a term strictly belonging to the "word-family" 'democracy', but some bastardizations like 'demo-liberal'. Restricting ourselves to the use with positive valuation, there is a very large dispersion in the
object of the valuation, i.e. in the elements of the structure which cause the positive affect.

This gives rise to difficulties because most authors consider those elements which lead to the strongest positive affect in them as (necessary and/or sufficient) criteria for the applicability of the term 'democracy'. These difficulties are increased by the fact that most of these authors apply the term to structures in which they believe the elements affecting them to be present, a belief which is not often shared by other authors.

Generally speaking, it seems to me that the term 'democracy' nowadays is applied in most cases to that type of structure which the speaker would like to exist (and often believe to exist) in the country they live in, and which satisfy some rather variable and unprecise conditions.

2. "Definitions" of the term 'democracy' given by statesmen, politicians and philosophers show considerable variability. It is unnecessary to quote evidence for that; some examples are given in the questionnaire and any one can find easily many further instances. Moreover most of these "definitions" are not based on conceptual analysis but rather on political and/or moral valuations of their author or of the ideological group represented by him. They therefore lack the philosophical "detachedness", required by the UNESCO-questionnaire. Even in as far as these "definitions" are accompanied by some kind of conceptual analysis, this usually consists only in quoting and commenting definitions by other authors and trying to find in these some elements which the author under consideration considers to be "essential".

This, of course, is the place where his own (personal or group) valuations enter into play.

Moreover I might remark that a quotation and examination
of "definitions" of and other statements about the term 'democracy' by statesmen, politicians, philosophers and other authors is not sufficient for a thorough conceptual analysis, and is perhaps not even the most important part of it (at least according to the present author's valuations). For the individuals mentioned use the term preponderantly in its speaker's aspects, viz in speaking and/or writing. Preponderantly, not exclusively, for they have read books about "democracy" and related subjects and have heard speeches or courses about it. But still the most frequent and most intensive use they make of the term is an active one, when they are writing or speaking about it, eventually to a fictitious listener, viz when they are "thinking" about it.

On the other hand the greatest influence the term exerts on actual behaviour of the people its listener's aspects, viz in individuals who use the term actively only occasionally (e.g. in private discussions), but in whom the ideas they associate with the term are preponderantly induced by what they have read or heard about it. Because they have interpreted the term and its context in their own way, bringing it into accordance with their own experience, expectations, wishes and volitions, the listener's aspects may be -- and, I believe very often are -- greatly different from the speaker's ones, and are hardly or not at all expressed by the "definitions".

Perhaps an individual case may illustrate this. During the interbellum an American professor once visited Moscow. One evening he was invited, together with some other foreign scientists, to some festivity. The American did not want to attend the meeting, and excused himself on the last moment by saying that he was not shaven. A Russian officially accompanying the group said: "Well, that does not matter at
all. We are here in a democratic country."

The American answered: "Is democracy a reason not to be clean?"

For us the question is: what did the Russian intend to express by the second sentence; how was it connected with the former one? Of course we can not know, only guess. But perhaps the following conjectured interpretation may be near to his original intentions.

Evidently the Russian knew, either by personal pre-revolution experience or from hearsay, that often people belonging to the poorer classes had felt frustrated when wishing to attend luxurious or official meetings, but not daring to go there. They may have feared being laughed at or considered uncivilised, because they had no good dress or were dirty or had worked-off hands, or some other deficiency in their outer appearance. Presumably the Russian used the term 'democracy' in order to indicate his belief that this kind of frustration did not occur anymore in his country, and that he appreciated this fact. The American, who may well never have experienced such kind of frustration, answered by a witty bon-mot, but could, of course, not grasp the Russian's emotions. He may perhaps have added in his thoughts: "If it is true that we are in a democratic country, no damned official shall hinder me to stay in my room when I desire to do so."

Whether this interpretation is completely or partially correct or not, the important thing for us is the fact that in any case such kinds of interpretations most frequently occur, perhaps are (strong) inducements for many people in their fight for democracy, but find hardly any or none expression at all in the current definitions.

I am inclined to consider the study of such highly fluctuating associations which, it seems to me, are (the strongest) emotional motors, as the most important task of a
conceptual analysis of the term 'democracy' and of other political terms.

The main difficulty, of course, is the fact that we have no appropriate methods for accomplishing this task. One might think of the investigation of mass-opinion. But I think that this would hardly provide us with any but trivial results. For 1° by asking people something one can only obtain knowledge about what people know themselves, whereas often subconscious or even unconscious associations and expectations may have the greatest motive force. And 2° the great variability, in particular the small but relevant half-shades are wiped out by the statistical treatment.

The best method, of course, would be a thorough and prolonged questioning of many individuals by trained psychologists, who moreover would have to be some - and not too little - knowledgeable and insight into conceptual research of the kind described in this paper. But evidently this method cannot be applied on a large scale.

The only practicable method I know of - and I am well aware how questionable its value is - is the method of "guessing", exemplified before, i.e. of trying to reconstruct from our general experience, acts of discourse of the type under consideration by recombining parts of previous experiences into assumed new ones.

3. It cannot be of any importance in conceptual analysis, whether the present author - or anyone else - personally considers...

1°. some definite use of the term 'democracy',

2°. an accusation of some definite use of the term 'democracy' of being a "misuse",

to be justified or not. It cannot be the task of a conceptual analyst - at least not with regard to political terms - to judge ways or using terms, but only to study them.

Hence we do not ask: "Do such and such groups use the term
"Democracy is a justified way or not?", but "When and how do all kinds of individuals and groups use the term "Democracy", and how do they (and other ones) react upon it?" In the same way we do not ask at present "Is such and such a charge of some use of being a 'misuse' justified or not?", but "Under which conditions do people charge someone else of "misuse" of a word (or of anything else); what do they express by such an accusation and how do other people react upon it?"

Although a scientific empirical investigation into this question might be somewhat less difficult than the one mentioned before (under 2), I don't think results of such a one are available, and I again can answer it only by "guessing" viz by trying to survey as many kinds of similar cases as possible which I have experienced (intentionally or not) or heard or read about. Admitting in advance all deficiencies of this procedure I think it is the best we can do at present.

Let us suppose therefore that someone, say A, charges someone else, B, who has used some word(s) (say 'Democracy') towards C, of having misused this word. Does this statement by A (at least partially) describe some characteristics of B's way of using the word(s)? It seems to me that in the great majority of cases where such a charge is made, it does not, or hardly. I think, it rather expresses some characteristic of A, viz his valuation will, I believe, in a still large majority of cases be strongly correlated with A's valuation of other activities of B. If A approves of most of B's activities, or, at least of B's purpose when using the word(s) under consideration towards B, he will rarely call it a "misuse". Hence in such cases A's charge of "misuse" depends on his valuations, hence on his emotions. This remains the case if A makes his charge on the base of some formal valuation-schema according to which he judges.
For in this case A's accepting this formal scheme, and in particularly his sticking to it, depends on his emotions and volitions. Moreover it will be very difficult, if possible at all, to find some formal criterion, not depending on A's emotions, with respect to which the term 'misuse' can be defined in such a way that its use according to the definition does not deviate too far from its ordinary use to make it undesirable to retain the same term.

Let us try as a possible definition: "A use of a term is called 'a misuse', if it falls far outside the ordinary field of dispersion of the term". This is not in accordance with customary uses of the term 'misuse'. For, if A approves of such a use of a term, he will usually not call it 'misuse', but e.g. 'metaphorical, poetic, illuminating, etc."

I might not state that terms like 'misuse' and 'metaphorical use' are, apart from their emotional and volitional content, completely synonymous, but only that in most cases the choice of one of those terms will depend to a considerable higher degree upon A's emotional attitude towards B's purpose and/or other activities than upon his way of speaking.

Anyhow, there is a large class of cases, where a considerable number of individuals A would apply the term 'misuse'. Viz., if A believes that B deliberately tried to deceive C. Let us consider an extreme case. Suppose B told A that he deliberately tried to deceive A. Let us e.g. consider a term T with but small dispersion in its listener's aspects, which, say, arouses in most listeners the expectation that some observable situation S will be present. Let us further assume that B expected C to act in some definite way as he (C) believed S to be present that he (B) desired C to act in this way, and therefore used the term T.

If B tells this to A, then A will in many cases say that B "misused" the term T. Not in all cases. If A greatly
approves of B's purpose, he may something like "How cunning!" "How very clever of you". Only in the comparatively rare cases where A approves of B's purpose, but disapproves of B's method - e.g. because of some more fundamental (e.g. ethical) valuation-scheme A accepts -, he may say "You should not have done that; you misused the term T". In this case A's valuations regarding B's purpose differ from B's ones, not in "sign", but only in degree. Whereas A desires B not to reach his (e.g. their common) purpose than to "deceive" C, for B the order of these valuations is the reverse one.

We further leave these details out of account, and return to the case where A for whatever reasons disapproves of B's effort to mislead C. This in any case seems to lead to a possible criterion for at least a considerable number of applications of the term 'misuse'. We must remark, however, that we have oversimplified the situation by assuming that B himself had told A about his "deceit". (And that A had believed him!) Usually, however, this will not be the case. Then A does not know, but only suspects B of having deceived C. It would lead us too far, to go into the extremely complicated problem of the interpretation of observational evidence under admission of the possibility of deliberate deceit. At present we can only say that the probability that A will suspect B of deliberate deceit again is strongly correlated with A's valuation of B's other activities and therefore again depends preponderantly on A's emotions, and that it will be rarely possible to prove such a suspicion in a way convincing B's adherents.

(If A does not assume deliberate deceit, he will in most cases not use the term 'misuse' but terms like 'unclear', 'unintelligible', 'ambiguous', 'misunderstanding', etc.)

Resuming these considerations, we may state that the current use of the term 'misuse' is such, that no criterion of its applicability can be given which is independent of the
emotional attitude of the subject using it towards the subject incriminated by it. Therefore any effort to define the term formally is based on taking parts in the controversy and therefore falls outside the limits of a philosophical analysis, and is a political rather than a philosophical activity.

Applying these general considerations to the alleged "misuse" of the term "democracy", more specifically described in the four classes of complaints of the questionnaire, we may remark that the terms 'catchword', 'slogan' (a), 'misled' (b), 'illegitimate', 'wrong', 'improper', 'steal', 'proport', 'justified' (c) etc. have a predominantly emotive function and that it will hardly be possible to replace them by more descriptive terms without the statements making lose their character of "complaints". (The term 'complaint' itself, of course, has a strong emotive content.)

The political nature of these complaints can be seen from the fact that they are always practically directed towards groups, one combats, and that analogous phenomena within one's own group are rarely remarked, or at least mentioned. Complaint (d) from which the emotional elements can be eliminated more easily seems to me to be more or less justified with regard to any definition I heard of, if applied to any existing country whatsoever. There are, however, differences in degree. I shall return upon this point in the answer of question 7.

After this elaborations I can at last answer question 3.

1°. Neither a charge of "misuse" nor a "justification" of of some use of the word "democracy" do I find under whatever conditions justified by conceptual analysis.

2°. As an emotional human being I also sometimes consider some uses of the word as "misuses", other ones as "justified"; my personal and variable emotions, however, are not of interest to the reader of this can.
3°. As a result of conceptual analysis I believe that it may be stated that a charge with "misuse" of a term by some subject A against another one B usually is strongly correlated with a negative emotional attitude of A against B, and is made in particular if A, led by these emotions, suspects B of deliberate deceit.

4. On the same grounds as before I don't see that any recommendation or rejection of some usage of a term whatever can be founded upon conceptual analysis. An analogous remark can be made regarding foundations on history or tradition. Many words are constantly used in "new and illegitimate" senses, without any one complaining. Some examples dating from the last few decades are 'broadcast', 'plano', 'parking', 'aptn', etc. etc. If complaints are made - except in a few cases by purists - , they do not refer so much to the way in which as to the purpose for which words are used. I shall not go therefore into the first half of the question.

5. I am not competent to judge this on historical grounds. As a conceptual analyst I only see small and hardly relevant differences between stating that there is one "Democracy" taking different forms in different historical situations or that there are as many "different democracies".

With regard to question 6 I might remark - though as a layman only on the domain of history - that it might be more easily to find common characteristics in political structures which are not called "democracies" than in those which are.

It might indeed be possible to find some common descriptive content in several of the current usages of the term 'democracy' by considering it as a relative concept. There might be some chance of finding a really analytic definition of the term 'democracy' by comparison with political structures replaced by them or existing in neighbour countries. Perhaps the following attempt might be tested by historians:
A political (and/or economic, and/or social) structure existing in a country on a definite moment is often called 'democracy' in comparison with a structure replaced by it in the same country or existing in neighbour countries, if representatives of comparatively larger groups of the population have comparatively greater or more direct influence on the government. (Here the term 'representatives' of a group is intended to denote individuals considered as such by the group itself, irrespective of their belonging or not — belonging to it).

This attempted analytic definition seems to account for most usages of the term 'democracy' in history, in particular for those mentioned in the questionnaire. Athenian democracy, in comparison with previous "tyrannies", with Spartan "aristocracy" and Persian "autocracy", called so because of the government by representatives of the citizens; Medieval democracy, called so as soon as the government by representatives of a king or an emperor was alleviated by privileges granting some local governmental influence to representatives of the citizens, guilds, etc.; Bourgeois democracy, called so in comparison with the government by representatives of the king, the clergy and the nobility was replaced or alleviated by representatives of the tiers état; Proletarian and Soviet-democracy, called so in comparison with "Bourgeois" democracy, where the influence on government of the numerically relatively small so called "possessing classes" was replaced by representatives of numerically larger group of wage-earning labourers. The formulation seems to account also for the difference often made between "true" or "real" and "existing" democracy, in as far as it is applied then to a fictitious structure the author has in mind, which in comparison with the one he lives under or he observes in other countries, shows either an increase of the number of people represented in the government, or of the influence their representatives have.
It remains questionable, however, whether or not this proposed definition will be found to cover all usages of the term 'democracy' in history and only these. Anyhow I do not think that it covers the most important parts of its present usages, at least not in their "listener's aspects", which probably are far more concerned with the results than with the form of government.

7. This very important question is concerned with the relation between "actual conditions" and "ideals". Instead of the latter I might speak about "illusions" or "beliefs".

Before going into this question I must remark that the distinction between "actual" or "real" and "imaginary", "illusion" etc. has a meaning only with reference to a judging subject (or to a formal system representing his judgement) In "first approximation" a subject uses the term 'real' for what he considers as such, and the term 'illusion' for what he does not. (The question under which circumstances a individual considers a perception as a "real observation" must remain here unconsidered. The answer might be related to the perception being or not being accompanied by a complex of other perceptions which usually accompany it, e.g. a visual perception by the usually accompanying sensory or auditive perceptions, i.e. those of hearing other persons tell that they have corresponding visual perceptions.

In "second approximation" a subject uses the term 'real' for what he expects that will be considered as real (say in first approximation) by other individuals (eventually later generations), or at least by those he considers as "sane" "sufficiently intelligent", etc. In any case the term remains relative to some such estimates by the speaker. I shall use the term, say in this second approximation, i.e. when calling something "real" I express thereby that I expect that "competent people after "close examination", eventually after a "sufficient lapse of time will consider it as such. Analogous remarks hold
with regard to the other terms mentioned before, which belong to the same "word-family".

Using the terms in this sense, I am indeed of opinion that a great part of the confusion with regard to the term 'democracy' is caused by confusion of actual conditions with what people believe them to be. This latter confusion is closely related with an overrating of the influence of legal formulae in comparison with other (e.g. social or economic) influences.

I shall mention some of these differences with respect to the Western "democracies". I am, however, convinced that with regard to the difference between actual and imagined conditions, albeit with reference to somewhat different ideals, the situation in Eastern Europe will be quite analogous, although I am not sufficiently acquainted with it to judge this with any certainty. The nature of this discussion encourages me to depart somewhat further from the "analytic" method and to mention some of my personal opinions. This I do the more reluctantly, as I have no competence on this domain and can speak only as an amateur.

A. It is often more or less implicitly assumed that free and universal suffrage guarantees legislature to be in accordance with the wishes of the majority of the voters, at least in countries with proportional representation (if not, some alterations in the following discussion are necessary). This, however, is not all necessary, and often not true either, by the following causes.

B. In most countries a voter does not — as it is usually supposed to be — choose a person which he trusts, but a person belonging to the party he votes for, and who is put on the list by the party-organisation. As there often are within a party great divergencies of opinion about many points, it is very well possible (and often occurs) that members of the party advocating opinions differing from the one held by the leaders of the party
are not chosen as candidates, or only as candidates on such places where there is little chance for them to be chosen. Even if the candidates are chosen by a majority-decision of the party-members, this majority may very well correspond to a minority of the voters supporting the party without belonging to it. On the other hand such voters may have little or no choice of party by reasons of social and economic standing, religion, tradition, etc. E.g. a Roman Catholic has hardly any choice of party, and it is very doubtful whether the candidates act in accordance with the wishes of many of them. A quite analogous situation holds e.g. in the Dutch labour party. A labourer who is not religious, and opposed to communism, has practically no choice of a party. Also Calvinists in Holland vote almost all for one party, irrespective of their social positions, so that decisions of their representatives may very well be contrary to their interests. Analogous remarks can be made for other parties and other countries.

b. Legally the ministers are responsible to the parliament for their governmental actions. This responsibility is interpreted as a duty to withdraw if a majority of the parliament desires such. Practically this implies the enormous advantage, which often is considered as the most essential characteristic of a "democratic" country, that if the popular opposition against the actions of a minister is sufficiently strong, so that it permeates the political parties, his regime can be ended without bloodshed. This extremely important fact, however, should not make us forget that this responsibility nevertheless is very restricted, as soon as the opposition is somewhat smaller. 1° A minister can take a great number of measures of minor importance, e.g. nominations of officials, with a very large range of freedom without being hampered by parliament. 2° Even if a majority of parliament disapproves of some action this action is very often formally approved of, in order to avoid a ministerial crisis, which might upset
the governmental equilibrium.

Hence by threatening to cause a crisis a minister may often decline to take a measure wished by a majority of parliament.

3°. Usually ministers are nominated as such as representatives of political parties. Not seldom their actions are largely determined by the party-leaders sometimes to such a degree that the dismissal of ministers depends on decisions of party-leaders rather than on those of parliament. The really responsible persons, viz the party-leaders don't bear any legal responsibility. Instead of party-leaders sometimes other individuals (e.g. those giving large subsidies to a party) may have an analogous large influence on governmental actions. They figure then as unofficial party-leaders.

Resuming these remarks we may state, that sometimes

1°. individuals are not allowed to vote for a party they would like to vote for by the leaders of a (e.g. religious) group they belong to, and they fear to be alienated from;

2°. opinions of the majority of voters for a party may be insufficiently represented because they need not be in accordance with those of the majority of the party-members, and because for some reason or another no other party comes into consideration for them;

3°. opinions of the majority of the members of a party are insufficiently represented because of too great an influence of the party-leaders;

4°. representatives of a party are not allowed to vote in parliament in accordance with their opinions by the government threatening with a crisis and the party-leaders consider such a one inopportune;

5°. ministers sitting for a party can not act in accordance with their opinions as the party-leaders prevent this by enforcing their dismissal on the base of "party-discipline".

Clearly by all these causes it is possible, and in fact not infrequent, that the measures taken by a government may
be even contrary to the wishes of the supporters of the party it sits for. This would even be still more frequent except for the propaganda inspired by the parties, in which these measures are represented as being either desirable or unavoidable.

In as far as the degree of "democracy" is measured by the degree of accordance between the wishes of the individuals and the results of the methods taken by the government, a partial improvement is possible by raising the degree of "democracy" within the parties, viz by taking care that all opinions in the party are proportionally represented in the higher organs, and by increasing considerably the responsibility before appropriate representative bodies of party-leaders and other official or unofficial individuals or corporations for all activities largely influencing governmental actions.

Theoretically a further improvement might perhaps be reached by replacing the one set of competitive ("parallel") parties existing today by an "interwoven" system of such sets, which were differentiated functionally. E.g. one set representing the different economic opinions and concerned with economic measures, another set representing the different religious (and a-religious) opinions and concerned with measures relative to public morals, etc., a third one representing the different opinions on exterior politics, etc. It is only by linking up e.g. economic with religious doctrines that an individual can be brought to sustain actually a policy contrary with his economic interests (at least in Holland).

Apart from assecuring an increase of coincidence of governmental measures with popular wishes, such an "interwoven" party-system would have the advantage that each individual would be placed in a "knot" of parties, so that another individual might be his opponent with regard to one set and his comrade with respect to another set of doctrines or measures. Clearly this might lead to a "leaking" through the
"isolated layers" existing today between the different ideologues, and thereby perhaps to making the controversies less ferocious.

Whilst mentioning this theoretically possible improvement by a strict separation of functions of the parties somewhat analogous to the "triurn politico" separating the functions of government I am, nevertheless, well aware of the facts that elaboration of this proposal might lead to considerable difficulties, 2° that its realisation is very improbable.

For it can hardly be expected that a system of government based on a set of competing parties will replace itself voluntarily by a system abolishing the existing parties and differentiating them into functionally different ones. Moreover, and still more important is, as it seems to me, the fact that this linking up of functionally different elements itself is in the interest of some groups, and in fact is an element of importance the so-called "struggle of classes".

2°. Analogous remarks could be made regarding the "freedoms", but a discussion of them would lead me too far. I might make only a few remarks.

a. Concerning the "freedom of choice of government". Whereas legislation in most Western countries defends (though not always prohibits) an individual to say to another one: "If you vote for such and such a party, you shall lose your job", or even "...you shall be killed", it allows him to say "...you shall burn eternally in hell" to someone who is innermost convinced that this is infinitely worse than loosing his job or being killed.

b. Concerning the "freedom of expression of opinion". On another occasion 2) I have tried to show that this concerns only the speaker's aspects of a political act of discourse, and that the listener's aspects are still more important. I have called these "freedom of formation of opinion", and mentioned some of their avoidable limitations. I might mention here the fact only that
a group of individuals who are required to risk far more than anyone else, namely their life, are neither allowed to form nor to express freely their opinion, nor also to have any influence at all, if only by voting, on the measures decisive for their future life. Formation and expression of opinion is allowed to soldiers only in as far as it is considered to be consistent with military disciplines, and the younger ones (and still more individuals which will be called into active service) fall below the limit of voters.

Concerning "equality of men". This is often interpreted in a formal way: any individual shall have "an equal chance" of reaching any level, e.g. of material wellfare, irrespective of etc. I.e. no legal measure shall hinder him to reach etc. Leaving out of consideration the fact that even this form there is often a considerable distance between the formula and its realisation, the term 'an equal chance', admits of other interpretations, which, I believe, are more closely connected with the average "listener's aspects" of ordinary people. For these will be far less concerned with legal measures hindering him to reach something than with his actually reaching it. It would have, however, lead me too far to go further into this.

I might finally remark that all these considerations are concerned only with different aspects of so called "political democracy", and that personally I am of opinion that the need of improving it is in the Western countries less urgent than improving the so called "social democracy", although some of my remarks above lead somewhat in the same direction.

Hardly at all. In a modern state "rule of (by) the majority" is not possible at all, perhaps with the exception of small states with highly intelligent inhabitants, and a relatively simple administration. In all other cases the effect to be expected of the great majority of governmental decisions can only be judged by a few
people having special information and knowledge. In fact, in
the Anglo-Saxon states the majority does not "rule" at all,
but does at best only express confidence in the persons or
the party-leaders which do. But even this is not always the
case. Often (but probably in a minority of cases) a person votes
for a party (or an individual representing it), not because he
has confidence in it, but because he has on grounds of tradition,
education and social status practically no choice.

Anyhow, the present party-system in the Anglo-Saxon and Western-
European countries excludes the possibility of a decisive
influence of the majority on most of the fundamental decisions,
because a voter by his vote accepts or rejects the policy of
the party as a whole. Therefore each party's needs include in
its program only one point which is considered as fundamental
by a group of the population, and on all other points may act
quite as it will. The party then has to convince its voters
by propaganda that the other points are in accordance with
their interests or their views and the voters often want to be
convinced, in order not to be necessitated to give up their
fundamental point and thereby to be left at a loose end.

On the other hand, the Russian view also is incorrectly
represented by Russell. There is perhaps even somewhat more of
a "rule of the majority" in Russia, because each individual
can have at least some small direct influence on some minor
points of the five-years-plan, e.g. concerning the work to be
done in his own factory. But even if this was not the case, and
if the second half of Russell's sentence would correctly
describe the actual situation in Russia, it certainly is not
"the Russian view" that it does.

11, 12, 13, 16, 29. With regard to the first of these questions
I might remark in the first place, that, like in questions 3 and
4, we cannot, without taking parts in the controversy, ask how
the term 'democracy' should be used, but only how it is used.
Further: it would be clearer to consider two "narrow" concepts
and one broad one: 1° methods of decision-making, whatever are the results, 2° results of decisions, by whatever methods they have been made, and 3° the combination of methods and results.

The question then is: "Does the term 'democracy' denote a comparatively high degree of 1° participation in governmental activity or 2° contentedness with its results or 3° both by/of comparatively large part of the population?

It seems to me that the distinction of the use of the word by a) philosophical and political authors and b) the majority of citizens, which was mentioned in the introduction, becomes of primary importance.

Unquestionably many "speakers" of type a), in particular in Western European and American countries use the term in the sense 1°. It seems to me — though I cannot give decisive proof — that the "listener's meaning" as mentioned in the introduction is primarily concerned with the results of government, in particular with those results which are of direct interest for the individuals considered. And that these users b) of the word 'democracy' accept the use 1° mainly because they expect — justly or unjustly — that it will automatically lead to improvement of their actual conditions of life, hence to the use 2°.

This leads us to the question: "Does it?", i.e. "justly or unjustly?" This question, however, is difficult to answer, if at all, in an unprejudiced way. For neither "contentedness" nor "improvement of actual conditions" are measurable quantities. Moreover improvement of conditions is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for increase of contentedness, and the controversy between "political" and "social democracy" can be shifted into a controversy, whether "increase of contentedness" or "improvement of conditions" is (or should be) the ultimate purpose of political activity. Nor can the causal relations between governmental and other activities (e.g. organisation of labor, strikers, etc.) with a change of com-
dictions (for better or for worse) be extricated in an undubitable way. It seems to me that a strict causal relation - "will automatically lead to" - is quite out of question, at least with the degree of participation which is customary in any country called 'democratic' today. Any attempt to prognosticate in how far an increased degree of participation would lead to an increased degree of contentedness seems to me to be of an emotional rather than a scientific nature, hence to be a replacement of one insufficiently founded expectation by another one.

In as far as the quotations from Lenin and Stalin given in the questionnaire have any descriptive function at all, it seems to me, that the most important part of it is meant to state as a fact that "democracy" in the "formal" sense 1° (cf. e.g. the quotation from Bryce) to the degree to which it is realised in the Western countries does (not only not necessarily but) not lead to "democracy" in the (say) "effective" sense 2°. Further they expect that instead of the parliamentary method of decision - making the method they call "dictature of the proletariat" will lead to this "effective" democracy. I don't see that this expectation rests on better foundations than the corresponding one concerning the parliamentary form.

Resuming these considerations, I might state as my opinion that the motive force of the democratic ideals for the majority of the population is directly related to "effective" democracy only; to "formal" democracy only in as far as it is believed to lead to an "effective" one. This assumed relation between "means and ends" is believed in the Western countries to exist between "parliamentary" and "effective" democracy in the East-European countries to exist between "dictature of the proletariat" and "effective democracy". Between the "ends" there might be considerably less difference for the majority of the populations in the two groups of
countries than between the assumed means.

With regard to conceptual analysis we can draw from these considerations the statement that a considerable part of the confusion might be caused by the fact that the emotive and volitive functions of the term 'democracy' are related for the larger part of the population to the use of the term in its "effective" sense 20, whereas the descriptive and formal functions, at least in the Western countries are primarily related to its use in the "formal" sense 10. The transfer of emotion from the "effective" to the "formal" interpretation might be caused partly by the use of the same term in the two senses ("shift of signification"), partly by the assumed causal relation.

It is desirable to investigate scientifically, in how far the emotions and expectations underlying the use of the term 'democracy' by other people than scientists, philosophers and politicians have or have not the nature ascribed to them on this paper, more or less as a conjecture without the pretension of sufficient scientific foundation. As a method for such an investigation aside mass-observation (which, as has been mentioned in the introduction can give only results of restricted importance, as it can only very indirectly be used for learning what the enquirers don't know themselves), I might point to the method, known as "attitude measuring", which has been used for other sociopsychological purposes. Perhaps some members of the Studie-Genootschap voor Psychische Masse-Hygiène at Amsterdam, eventually in cooperation with other scientists, might be willing to work out and to apply such a method.
Notes

1) Recent development on the contrary shows a lowering of this
degree. Today often governmental decisions are taken before
being approved of by the parliament, which is thereby more
or less reduced to a group of "Ja-Sagers". In the same way
decisions by party-boards are often taken nowadays before
or even without being approved of by the majority even of
the active party-members (viz those who assist to party-
assembling).

2) D. van Dantzig, Vrijheid van meningsvorming, De Groene

3) More precisely: the leaders of the party.